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FIGHTING THE UNDEAD: WHY STATES 
SHOULD USE FORCED VESTING TO  
KILL ZOMBIE MORTGAGES 
Abstract: Following the financial crisis, many home mortgage borrowers found 
themselves living in properties encumbered by debt that far exceeded their value. 
The result was an increase in mortgage default rates, followed by a wave of fore-
closures as lenders scrambled to minimize the financial damage to their invest-
ments. From the wreckage, a new creature emerged that threatened to devastate 
borrowers who believed that foreclosure was their chance for a fresh start: the 
zombie mortgage. With a spike in lenders failing or declining to foreclose on prop-
erties, borrowers were unexpectedly facing an unwanted burden of homeownership 
that would cause them and their communities severe distress. As states and courts 
began to fight back, the number of zombie mortgages declined. Yet to this day, 
zombies can be found across the country and the risk that more will rise is quite re-
al. This Note argues that a potential solution is for state legislatures to enact forced 
vesting provisions. Specifically, this Note evaluates the potential effect of such 
laws through a law and economics lens and concludes that such provisions would 
be beneficial. 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2008 financial crisis sent real estate prices plummeting, as home values 
dropped and borrowers of home mortgages began defaulting on payments.1 Ris-
ing default rates led to increases in foreclosures as lenders attempted to take back 
the homes from defaulting borrowers.2 Often times, borrowers who believed that 
foreclosure meant they would lose their homes simply chose to walk away and 
allow their lenders to repossess the property.3 With a declining demand for hous-
es, however, there were fewer willing buyers in the market, leading to foreclo-
sures that banks never completed.4 As a result, borrowers unknowingly retained 
the titles to their homes, assuming all the liabilities that came with continued 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF 
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 391–92 (2011) [hereinafter FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT] (describing how 
home values fell and providing a graph that shows the decline in value of household assets). 
 2 Id. at 402. 
 3 Andrea Clark, Comment, Amidst the Walking Dead: Judicial and Nonjudicial Approaches for 
Eradicating Zombie Mortgages, 65 EMORY L.J. 795, 801 (2016). 
 4 See JACK P. FRIEDMAN ET AL., REAL ESTATE HANDBOOK 1–2 (8th ed. 2013) (noting how home 
sales declined) [hereinafter REAL ESTATE HANDBOOK]; Clark, supra note 3, at 801–02 (explaining that 
lenders sometimes decided not to complete foreclosures). 
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home ownership.5 This led to an increase in what has become known as a zom-
bie mortgage: a property in terrible condition that is not being taken care of by 
the borrower or the lender and to which the borrower still has legal title.6 
To understand the reasoning behind the now-accepted term “zombie mort-
gage,” one only needs to look at the traditional conception of a “zombie.”7 In the 
context of mortgages, that idea is accurate: a title to property that simply will not 
die, resulting in the decaying remains of what used to be a home.8 These homes 
are usually unappealing to the eye and are visibly unkempt.9 Although television 
shows like The Walking Dead might suggest removing the head to kill a zombie, 
killing zombie mortgages may be better left to the heads of state legislatures.10 
Part I of this Note discusses how the 2008 financial crisis led to an increase 
in zombie mortgages and discusses current relevant law.11 Part II of this Note 
examines how bankruptcy courts introduced the concept of forced vesting—
compulsorily giving title to lenders—to deal with zombie mortgages and how 
state statutes have attempted to resolve the issue.12 Part II also introduces the law 
and economics perspective as a viable lens to examine the problem.13 Part III of 
this Note uses a law and economics approach to evaluate why state legislatures 
should consider using forced vesting to prevent the rise of future zombies mort-
gages and examines the financial incentives of borrowers and lenders from a tax 
perspective.14 
                                                                                                                           
 5 Clark, supra note 3, at 802. These liabilities include state property taxes and the costs of main-
taining the home, as well as mortgage obligations. Id. 
 6 Id. at 795. See generally Andrea Boyack & Robert Berger, Bankruptcy Weapons to Terminate a 
Zombie Mortgage, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 451 (2015) (discussing zombie mortgages); David P. Weber, 
Zombie Mortgages, Real Estate, and the Fallout for the Survivors, 45 N.M. L. REV. 37 (2014) (same); 
Amanda McQuade, Comment, The Antidote to Zombie Foreclosures: How Bankruptcy Courts Should 
Address the Zombie Foreclosure Crisis, 32 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 507 (2016) (same). 
 7 See Zombie, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (online ed.), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/zombie [https://perma.cc/SA6C-96QQ] (providing definitions such as “a will-
less and speechless human” and “a person held to resemble the so-called walking dead”). 
 8 See Barbara Liston, More Than 300,000 Homes Are Foreclosed “Zombies,” Study Says, REU-
TERS, Mar. 28, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-housing-zombies/more-than-300000-
homes-are-foreclosed-zombies-study-says-idUSBRE92R0YQ20130328 [https://perma.cc/Y7GF-
2MWU] (mentioning the unsightly nature of properties with zombie mortgages); see also Kathy 
Welsh, Schneiderman to Address Problem of “Zombie Properties,” HUDSON VALLEY NEWS NET-
WORK, Feb. 16, 2015, https://hudsonvalleynewsnetwork.com/2015/02/16/schneiderman-address-
problem-zombie-properties [https://perma.cc/88XK-YMT8] (depicting a house with rotting paint, 
broken windows, and a boarded up door). 
 9 See Welsh, supra note 8 (describing the state of a house with a zombie mortgage). 
 10 See Morgan v. Comm’r, 309 U.S. 78, 80–81 (1940) (stating that state law initially determines 
one’s property rights); The Walking Dead (AMC television broadcasts Oct. 31, 2010-Present). 
 11 See infra notes 15–94 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 96–167 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 96–167 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 168–233 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE RISE OF THE ZOMBIE MORTGAGE 
The financial crisis devastated the U.S. housing market, sending home 
prices plummeting to approximately one-third of their previous value.15 Sales 
of new single-family homes dropped dramatically, eventually accounting for 
only a fraction of the number of sales in 2005.16 The decline in home values 
led to properties that were worth substantially less than their mortgages.17 By 
2010, nearly one quarter of all mortgaged homes had mortgages with outstand-
ing debt that was higher than the home value.18 As the default rate rose, fore-
closures began rising as well, with over two percent of all U.S. households 
having at least one foreclosure filing against them in 2009.19 In that year nearly 
ten percent of all mortgages were delinquent by at least one payment.20 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at 391–92 (finding that home values fell 
by 32% from the height of the housing bubble in 2006 to their lowest point in 2009 after the burst); Atif 
Mian et al., Foreclosures, House Prices, and the Real Economy, 70 J. FIN. 2587, 2587 (Dec. 2015) (find-
ing that the decline in housing prices was 35%). See generally S&P DOW JONES INDICES, S&P CORE-
LOGIC CASE-SHILLER U.S. NATIONAL HOME PRICE NSA INDEX, http://us.spindices.com/indices/real-
estate/sp-corelogic-case-shiller-us-national-home-price-nsa-index [https://perma.cc/P6UL-C24W] (gra-
phing the trends in the prices of single-family homes with the highest point prior to the crash occurring in 
2006 and the lowest point post-crash in 2012). 
 16 See REAL ESTATE HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 1–2 (stating that sales declined 46% from 2005 to 
2010). 
 17 Cem Demiroglu et al., State Foreclosure Laws and the Incidence of Mortgage Default, 57 J. L. 
ECON. 225, 225 (2014). Homes with values less than their mortgages are said to have “negative equi-
ty” or to be “underwater.” See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at 403–04 (discuss-
ing the drop in home values). The number of homes with negative equity is considered by many to be 
the most significant predictor of mortgage default. Id. at 403. Second in significance is borrowers 
experiencing financial hardship or lenders increasing mortgage payments, causing payments to be-
come unaffordable for borrowers. Id. at 402–03. 
 18 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at 403–04. The proportion of homes with 
underwater mortgages varies across states. See id. at 404 (showing a shaded map of the United States with 
different shades corresponding to different percentages of underwater mortgages). States with the highest 
proportion of underwater mortgages in 2010 were Nevada, Arizona, California, Michigan, and Florida, 
with Nevada having the highest proportion at 67%. Id. at 403–04. 
 19 Id. at 402. The foreclosure rate had long been below 1%, but the filing rate rose following the 
crisis and reached as high as 2.2% in 2009. Id. This increase in mortgage delinquencies led to an in-
crease in the average length of foreclosure from nine to fifteen months. Kyle F. Herkenhoff & Lee E. 
Ohanian, The Impact of Foreclosure Delay on U.S. Employment 2 (National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Working Paper No. 21532, 2015), https://www.nber.org/papers/w21532.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MX7H-D74P]. Since then, the average length of foreclosure had been on a steady increase. 
533,813 U.S. Properties with Foreclosure Filings in First Six Months of 2016, Down 11 Percent from 
a Year Ago, REALTYTRAC, (July 13, 20016), https://www.realtytrac.com/news/midyear-2016-
foreclosure-market-report [https://perma.cc/EU8E-4SNL]. By mid-2016, the average length was 629 
days. Id. 
 20 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at 402 (stating that one in every eleven 
mortgages was at least a single payment behind). Lenders were visibly reluctant to renegotiate better 
terms with borrowers by decreasing payments. See Adelino et al., Why Don’t Lenders Renegotiate 
More Home Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-Cures and Securitization, 60 J. MONETARY ECON. 835, 835 
(2013) (discussing lender opposition to renegotiation). In fact, fewer than 2% of significantly overdue 
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A. The Rise of the Zombie Mortgage and the Concept of “Forced Vesting” 
A mortgage becomes a zombie when a property is legally owned by the 
borrower but had long been “abandoned,” leaving behind the decrepit remains 
of what used to be a home.21 This occurs when a lender stops the foreclosure 
process on a property that the borrowers had vacated, leaving the empty home 
behind.22 In such situations, because the foreclosure sales are never finalized, 
borrowers will have unknowingly retained title to the homes and, along with it, 
all obligations and liabilities that accompany the property and the mortgage.23 
During the financial crisis, plummeting home values and high default rates 
spelled trouble for the lending community, as the costs of foreclosing on cer-
tain properties outweighed the potential returns.24 This prompted many lenders 
to stop their pursuit of foreclosures, never completing the process.25 
The spike in foreclosures resulted in multiple zombie properties, with one 
report claiming that there were over 300,000 abandoned homes by 2013.26 Of 
those abandoned homes, about 44,000 were classified as zombie properties in 
the third quarter of 2013.27 Most often, these zombie mortgages were prevalent 
in low-income areas where property values are lower.28 Eventually, lenders 
retaliated against the spread of zombie properties and began selling them at a 
                                                                                                                           
mortgages received a sizable reduction to their mortgage obligations, whereas 8% received only a 
miniscule reduction. Id. at 851. 
 21 Clark, supra note 3, at 795. See generally Boyack & Berger, supra note 6; Weber, supra note 
6; McQuade, supra note 6. “Abandonment” here refers to the common use of the term, which has a 
different meaning in a legal sense. See Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 191, 196 (2010) (explaining that there is a difference between the use of “abandon” in 
personal and legal contexts). 
 22 Clark, supra note 3, at 801–02. Many homeowners, in the honest belief that their homes were 
going to be lost, chose to simply walk away and abandon their homes, leaving the properties to lend-
ers. Id. Lenders will often not even give notice to borrowers that a foreclosure has been cancelled. Id. 
at 802. Currently, lenders appear to have no legal obligation to notify borrowers of such cancellations. 
Id. 
 23 See id. at 802 (explaining that, even though the borrower may have abandoned the home long 
ago, if the foreclosure never concludes, a borrower remains liable for all taxes and fees associated 
with the property, as well as his or her original mortgage obligations). 
 24 See id. at 801–02 (explaining how lenders evaluate potential costs and revenues in foreclosure 
settings). 
 25 Id. 
 26 See Liston, supra note 8 (providing data on the number of homes abandoned subsequent to 
foreclosure in 2013). The problem was especially prevalent in Florida, which contained over 90,000 
abandoned properties in 2013. Id. Kentucky, with less than 1,000 homes in foreclosure in 2013, still 
had more than half of them abandoned. Id. 
 27 Vacant Property Rate Increases from a Year Ago in 54 Percent of U.S. Local Housing Markets 
in Q3 2017, ATTOM DATA SOLUTIONS (Oct. 24, 2017),  https://www.attomdata.com/news/risk/2017-
u-s-residential-vacant-property-zombie-foreclosure-report [https://perma.cc/DJN4-QENF] [hereinafter 
Vacant Property Rate]; see Clark, supra note 3, at 795 (describing zombie properties). 
 28 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES: ADDITIONAL SERVICED 
ACTIONS COULD HELP REDUCE THE FREQUENCY AND IMPACT OF ABANDONED FORECLOSURES 14 
(2010). 
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rapid pace.29 By the end of 2017, their presence had been reduced to approxi-
mately 14,300.30 Although the number of zombies has diminished, those that 
remain have significant effects on their surrounding neighborhoods and com-
munities.31 Homes located near these zombie properties are subject to declines 
in value, and neighborhoods may suffer increased crime rates.32 
While zombie mortgages spread, the concept of “forced vesting” arose in 
bankruptcy courts as individuals sought relief from their financial woes.33 
Bankruptcy’s fresh start policy is one of the cornerstones of the Bankruptcy 
Code, which allows honest, financially distressed individuals to discharge cer-
tain debts.34 Some bankruptcy courts have allowed a debtor to forcibly vest 
title in a home to a creditor over the creditor’s objection under a Chapter 13 
bankruptcy plan, which is a plan establishing a debtor’s three-to-five-year re-
payment schedule.35 After the fallout of the financial crisis, this idea developed 
                                                                                                                           
 29 Diana Olick, Wiping Out Housing’s ‘Zombies’: Banks Sell Off Foreclosed Remnants of Crash, 
CNBC (Sep. 8 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/08/wiping-out-housings-zombies-banks-sell-
off-foreclosed-remnants-of-crash.html. The conditions of some of these homes were so terrible that 
they sold for miniscule amounts. See id. (giving an example of a property in Atlantic City that report-
edly sold for $3,000). 
 30 Vacant Property Rate, supra note 27. 
 31 Weber, supra note 6, at 40. The poor condition of zombie properties may imply that neighbor-
hoods are unsafe, causing declines in property values. See Boyack & Berger, supra note 6, at 452 
(discussing safety issues and effects on property values); Marissa Weiss, Attack of the Zombie Proper-
ties, 47 URB. L. 485, 487 (2015). 
 32 Weber, supra note 6, at 45. The abandoned homes may invite squatters, drug use, and other 
crimes like arson and theft. Weiss, supra note 31, at 487. 
 33 See, e.g, In re Tosi, 546 B.R. 487, 489 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2016) (denying a plan that forcibly 
vested title in a lender); In re Sagendorph, No. 14-41675-MSH, 2015 WL 3867955, at *1, *2 (Bankr. 
D. Mass. June 22, 2015), rev’d, In re Sagendorph, 562 B.R. 545 (D. Mass. 2017) (allowing a debtor to 
forcibly vest title in a lender); In re Zair, 535 B.R. 15, 17 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 2015), rev’d, HSBC Bank 
USA, N.A. v. Zair, 550 B.R. 188 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (confirming a plan that vested title in a lender); In 
re Stewart, 536 B.R. 273, 274 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2015) (approving a plan that vested title in a lender 
because the lender failed to object); In re Williams, 542 B.R. 514, 517 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2015) (deny-
ing a debtor’s motion to confirm a plan vesting title in a lender); In re Watt, 520 B.R. 834, 835–36 
(Bankr. D. Or. 2014), vacated Bank of New York Mellon v. Watt, No. 3:14-CV-02051-AA, 2015 WL 
1879680 (D. Or. Apr. 22, 2015) (confirming a plan that vested title in a bank over the bank’s objec-
tion); In re Rosa, 495 B.R. 522, 523 (Bankr. D. Haw. 2013) (approving a Chapter 13 plan that vested 
title in a mortgagee because the mortgagee did not object). 
 34 Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (citing Grogan v. Garner, 498 
U.S. 279, 286–87). 
 35 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (tracking the development of the concept of forced 
vesting as part of a bankruptcy). In a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, a debtor files for bankruptcy and devel-
ops a plan in which they will pay creditors over the course of three to five years. Chapter 13—
Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-
basics/chapter-13-bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/R6ZC-5Z84]. A plan is “confirmed” upon the 
bankruptcy court’s approval. Id. Debtors keep their property and, if the plan is successfully followed, 
will receive a discharge of their outstanding debts. Marrama, 549 U.S. at 367. Sections 1322 and 1325 
of the Bankruptcy Code govern the confirmation of Chapter 13 plans. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1325 
(2016); In Re Sagendorph, 562 B.R. at 547. Section 1322(a) lists the required elements of the plan and 
(b) lists what the plan “may” have. § 1322(a)–(b). In terms of vesting, Section 1322(b)(9) permits a 
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through the bankruptcy system, becoming more aggressive with time as bank-
ruptcy courts began confirming plans over the express objections of lenders.36 
Courts have not viewed the case for forced vesting in Chapter 13 bankruptcies 
favorably on appeal.37 Nonetheless, some of those courts have expressed under-
standing of the situations of individuals who resorted to bankruptcy for relief.38 
B. An Overview of Foreclosure 
Foreclosure occurs when a borrower, usually faced with some sort of fi-
nancial hardship, stops making monthly mortgage payments, prompting the 
lender to initiate action to take possession of the home and sell it to satisfy the 
money owed.39 Foreclosure is based in state law, which determines the legal 
process that a lender must follow to properly take someone’s home.40 The dif-
ferences in state law are generally classified in two different categories: judi-
                                                                                                                           
plan to contain a provision vesting property in a debtor or another party. Id. § 1322(b)(9). Section 
1325 provides the requirements that a bankruptcy plan must meet to be confirmed. Id. § 1325(a). 
There are three ways in which a Chapter 13 plan may treat claims secured by a property interest. Id. 
§ 1325(a)(5). The third potential way for a plan to treat such a claim is for the debtor to “surrender” 
the property to the claim holder. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(C). 
 36 For a series of cases tracking the development of bankruptcy courts’ increasingly permissive 
responses to forced vesting, see In re Sagendorph, 2015 WL 3867955, at *4 (holding that the Bank-
ruptcy Code permits a debtor to vest title in other entities and that federal bankruptcy law overcomes 
state law concerns as to such provisions); In re Stewart, 536 B.R. at 276, 278 (holding that because 
the lender did not object to the provision, the borrower could execute a quitclaim deed transferring 
title to the lender); In re Watt, 520 B.R. at 839 (ruling that although the lender objected to the provi-
sion, the Bankruptcy Code allows debtors to vest title to property in other entities, and the plan may 
therefore be confirmed over the objection); In re Rosa, 495 B.R. at 525 (ruling that a borrower’s pro-
vision transferring title to the lender in the Chapter 13 plan was permissible because the lender’s lack 
of objection constituted acceptance). Other bankruptcy courts have refused to permit an interpretation 
of the Bankruptcy Code that permits forced vesting. See In re Tosi, 546 B.R. at 493–94 (explaining 
that surrender and vesting are two separate sets of legal relationships to property and allowing a debtor 
to forcibly vest title to a lender would be inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code); In re Williams, 542 
B.R. at 521 (expressing that allowing such a provision would violate a lender’s rights under state law). 
 37 See generally In re Sagendorph, 562 B.R. 545 (reversing the bankruptcy court’s allowance of 
forced vesting); Watt, 2015 WL 1879680 (D. Or. Apr. 22, 2015) (holding that the bankruptcy court’s 
allowance of forced vesting was improper). 
 38 See In re Sagendorph, 562 B.R. at 558 (noting that forced vesting is an appropriate response to 
the financial crisis and aligns with the idea of bankruptcy’s equitable nature). Although the district 
court understood the reasoning and policy of the bankruptcy court, it held that, even if forced vesting 
may be desirable, the statutory language of § 1322 and § 1325 prohibits such provisions. Id. at 554–
55. The court left the question open of whether other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code could 
achieve the same result. Id. at 558. 
 39 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at 402; FRANKIE ORLANDO & MARSHA 
FORD, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO LOCATING, NEGOTIATING, AND BUYING REAL ESTATE FORECLO-
SURES 41 (2d ed. 2016). 
 40 See Mian, supra note 15, at 2594; Mortgage Law: Judicial vs. Non-Judicial Foreclosure, THE 
LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/article/mortgage-law-judicial-vs-non-judicial-foreclosure 
[https://perma.cc/D6PC-L6UC] [hereinafter Judicial vs. Non-Judicial Foreclosure]. 
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cial and non-judicial foreclosures.41 The majority of states are non-judicial 
foreclosure states.42 
1. Judicial Foreclosure States 
Judicial foreclosure states require the lender to go through the court sys-
tem to foreclose on a property.43 Typically, these are states where lenders se-
cure their interest in a borrower’s home with a mortgage.44 In these states, the 
foreclosure process is initiated when a lender files a complaint with the court.45 
The lender then bears the burden of proving that it has a right to foreclose on 
the property.46 After the filing of a complaint, the court conducts a foreclosure 
hearing and, if the lender is successful, issues a judgment in favor of the lender 
indicating that it may proceed with the foreclosure.47 The date for the sale is 
then set and the public is notified, after which the property is sold to the high-
est bidder.48 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Foreclosure Laws and Procedures by State, REALTYTRAC, https://www.realtytrac.com/real-
estate-guides/foreclosure-laws [https://perma.cc/AXH6-AR3P] (providing a chart of the fifty states 
and District of Columbia and indicating whether each uses judicial foreclosures, non-judicial foreclo-
sures, or both). There appears to be disagreement over the proper classification of Massachusetts. 
Compare id. (listing Massachusetts as only a judicial foreclosure state), with JOHN RAO & GEOFF 
WALSH, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CENT., FORECLOSING A DREAM (2009) (listing Massachusetts as a 
non-judicial foreclosure state). RealtyTrac justifies its classification of Massachusetts as a judicial 
foreclosure state because the state requires that a lender obtain a judgment from the Land Court before 
the property is sold. Massachusetts Foreclosure Laws, RealtyTrac, https://www.realtytrac.com/real-
estate-guides/foreclosure-laws/massachusetts-foreclosure-laws [https://perma.cc/D8E5-DGNQ]. 
 42 ORLANDO & FORD, supra note 39, at 44. 
 43 Judicial vs. Non-Judicial Foreclosure, supra note 40. 
 44 ORLANDO & FORD, supra note 39, at 44. In these states, a borrower signs both a note indicating 
a promise to pay the lender and signs a mortgage, which secures the debt by giving the lender a lien 
on the property. Judicial vs. Non-Judicial Foreclosure, REALTYTRAC, https://www.realtytrac.com/
real-estate-guides/foreclosure/judicial-vs-non-judicial-foreclosure [https://perma.cc/UXA7-SGQP]. 
 45 ORLANDO & FORD, supra note 39, at 44. The complaint will contain information concerning 
the amount of money the lender is owed, the missed payments, and why the absence of payments 
should be cause to allow the lender to sell the property. Mian, supra note 15, at 2594. 
 46 Demiroglu, supra note 17, at 228. In fact, in 2010, three large lenders whose employees illegal-
ly provided inaccurate information on mortgage documents stopped foreclosures in judicial foreclo-
sure states because judges would not be willing to approve foreclosure sales of homes with erroneous 
mortgage documents. Andrew Martin & David Streitfeld, Flawed Foreclosure Documents Thwart 
Home Sales, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/business/08frozen.html 
[https://perma.cc/EZ55-M4AB]. The lenders’ actions were spurred by the fact that judicial foreclosure 
states require a judge’s approval prior to a foreclosure sale. Id. Although the problem of inaccurate 
mortgage paperwork may have also been prevalent in non-judicial foreclosure states, in those states a 
judge is only involved when a borrower sues the lender, which is uncommon because borrowers often 
lack the funds to sue. Id. 
 47 ORLANDO & FORD, supra note 39, at 44. Borrowers may, of course, respond to the complaint 
and attempt to triumph over the lender in court. Judicial vs. Non-Judicial Foreclosure, supra note 40. 
 48 ORLANDO & FORD, supra note 39, at 44. 
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Foreclosures in judicial foreclosure states typically take longer to process 
and are costlier than in non-judicial foreclosure states.49 It is common for judi-
cial foreclosure states to have right of redemption laws as well, giving home-
owners the opportunity to take back their property post-sale within an allotted 
period of time if they are able to come up with the funds.50 These redemption 
rights vary by state and can last for up to one year after the foreclosure sale.51 
2. Non-Judicial Foreclosure States 
Non-judicial foreclosure states do not require the lender to go through the 
court system to foreclose on a property.52 In these states, lenders use deeds of 
trust as opposed to a mortgage to secure their interest in the property.53 The 
deed of trust has a “power-of-sale clause” which allows a lender to bypass the 
court system and initiate the foreclosure proceedings by giving notice to the 
borrower and by calling for the trustee to sell the property if the borrower does 
not rectify the situation.54 In these states, the burden of proof shifts to the bor-
rower to show that the lender may not foreclose on the property.55 Non-judicial 
foreclosure states typically have higher rates of foreclosure, as it often takes 
less time and money to foreclose because the court system is not involved.56 
                                                                                                                           
 49 See Demiroglu, supra note 17, at 228 (finding that as of 2014, the average length of the fore-
closure process in judicial foreclosure states from beginning to end was twenty months). 
 50 ORLANDO & FORD, supra note 39, at 44; Michael J. Gomez, Bankruptcy and the Tax Impact of 
Foreclosure for Consumer Debtors, 30 CAL. BANKR. J. 73, 78 (2009). If the previous homeowner is 
successful, he or she may buy the property back from whomever bought it at the foreclosure sale. 
ORLANDO & FORD, supra note 39, at 44. Although the buyer is compensated for the purchase price 
when a previous homeowner exercises a right of redemption, the buyer may lose money spent on 
repairs, because the homeowner is not required to pay for those supplemental expenditures. Id. The 
homeowner may have to pay other fees associated with maintaining the property, but these costs do 
not include improvements made to the property. Id. at 44–45. 
 51 Foreclosure Laws and Procedures by State, supra note 41. The redemption period varies wide-
ly by state. See id. (listing the redemption periods for all fifty states and the District of Columbia). For 
example, New Jersey only gives a period of ten days, while Kansas gives 365 days. Id. Some judicial 
foreclosure states, like Pennsylvania, do not provide for any redemption period, so a resident has no 
guaranteed right to buy back the property. Id. 
 52 Id.; Judicial vs. Non-Judicial Foreclosure, supra note 40. 
 53 ORLANDO & FORD, supra note 39, at 44. A deed of trust differs from a mortgage in that it adds a 
trustee, who holds title to the property until the debt is paid. Two Important Differences Between a Mort-
gage and Deed of Trust, THE LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/article/two-important-
differences-mortgage-deed-trust [https://perma.cc/ZDR9-DVF3]. Because the trustee has title to the 
property, the trustee may sell the property for the benefit of the lender without court approval. Id. 
 54 Judicial vs. Non-Judicial Foreclosure, supra note 44. 
 55 Demiroglu, supra note 17, at 228. Although non-judicial foreclosure states do not require court 
involvement, the borrower may still bring an action against the lender to attempt to stop the foreclo-
sure from taking place. Judicial vs. Non-Judicial Foreclosure, supra note 40. 
 56 See Mian, supra note 15, at 2596 (charting the ratio of foreclosures to delinquent mortgages in 
all fifty states and the District of Columbia). The data indicate that the states with the highest ratios 
were typically non-judicial foreclosure states. Id. 
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These states may also have redemption laws.57 In fact, Tennessee, a non-judicial 
foreclosure state, has an exceptionally long redemption period of two years, dur-
ing which homeowners have the opportunity to get back their property.58 
Although the likelihood of default does not vary among borrowers in judi-
cial and non-judicial foreclosure states, the latter nonetheless have a higher rate 
of foreclosure.59 Data from 2005–2011 indicate that, six months after being con-
sidered “seriously delinquent,” nearly 20% of borrowers lost their homes in non-
judicial foreclosure states as compared to less than 3% of borrowers in judicial 
foreclosure states.60 Moreover, after eighteen months of delinquency, less than 
25% of borrowers in non-judicial foreclosure still had title to their homes as op-
posed to over 40% of borrowers in judicial foreclosure states.61 
C. An Overview of Tax Law and Its Relation to Foreclosure 
The Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) has certain provisions that are rele-
vant to the discussion of foreclosure.62 Sections 1 and 11 list the tax rates for 
individuals and corporations, respectively.63 Section 61, which defines gross 
income, includes both “gains derived from dealings in property” and “income 
from discharge of indebtedness”—i.e., forgiven debts that are considered “in-
come”—in gross income.64 Section 108, however, provides some instances in 
which income from the discharge of indebtedness may be excluded from gross 
income (and thus not taxed), including when the discharge occurs within bank-
                                                                                                                           
 57 Foreclosure Laws and Procedures by State, supra note 41. 
 58 See id. (showing that Tennessee has a redemption period of 730 days—a year longer any other 
state’s redemption period). 
 59 Mian, supra note 15, at 2596–99. 
 60 Kristopher Gerardi et al., Do Borrower Rights Improve Borrower Outcomes? Evidence from 
the Foreclosure Process, 73 J. URB. ECON. 1, 7–8 (2013). The disparity decreases after the six-month 
mark. Id. “Seriously delinquent” means that the borrowers have missed a substantial amount of pay-
ments. Id. at 7. 
 61 Id. at 7–8. During delinquency, borrowers make no payments on their mortgage, so those in 
judicial foreclosure states are more likely to live rent-free for a longer period of time. Id. at 7. 
 62 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1, 11, 61, 108, 121, 166, 1001, 1011, 1012, 1016 (2018) (referring to various 
rules that affect taxable income). These provisions require the inclusion of certain items in gross in-
come, allowable exclusions from gross income, and the calculation of gain in a sale or exchange of 
property. Id. 
 63 Id. §§ 1, 11. 
 64 Id. § 61(a)(3), (11). The statutory language makes it clear that the list of items that may be 
included in gross income is not an exclusive list. Id. § 61(a). The Supreme Court has construed this 
language broadly, finding that Congress did not place any limitations in this provision of the Internal 
Revenue Code (“IRC”). Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 429–30 (1955). The Court recog-
nized that Congress’s choice of language was meant to allow for taxation of all gains except for those 
explicitly exempted. Id. at 430. “Income from discharge of indebtedness” is essentially debt one owes 
that is “forgiven, cancelled, or otherwise discharged,” thereby constituting income in the amount of 
the discharged debt. Colonial Sav. Ass’n & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r., 854 F.2d 1001, 1004 (7th Cir. 
1988). 
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ruptcy or when the borrower is insolvent.65 Section 121 lays out when borrow-
ers may exclude income from the sale or exchange of their principal resi-
dence.66 Section 166 explains when businesses (such as lenders) may deduct 
bad debts, being debts that become “worthless within the taxable year,” from 
their taxes.67 Finally, Section 1001 provides the formula for calculating the 
gain or loss from a disposition of property, such as a sale or other transfer.68 
Foreclosure may raise tax consequences for a borrower.69 For federal tax 
purposes, two classes of mortgages are relevant: recourse and nonrecourse 
mortgages.70 Recourse mortgages are mortgages that permit a lender to pursue 
a borrower for any remaining amount owed after proceeds from the foreclosure 
sale are applied to the debt.71 Nonrecourse mortgages only permit a lender to 
foreclose on a borrower’s home, but not to pursue the borrower personally for 
any outstanding debt owed.72 In general, borrowed money, like a mortgage, 
does not constitute taxable income to the borrower because there is an offset-
                                                                                                                           
 65 26 U.S.C. § 108(a). This section also allows for the exclusion from gross income of the dis-
charge of “qualified principal residence indebtedness” that occurred prior to January 1, 2018, or re-
sulted from a written agreement entered into prior to that date. Id. “Qualified principal residence in-
debtedness” is debt incurred in buying or improving a taxpayer’s main residence and secured by the 
home, but not in excess of $2,000,000. Id. §§ 108(h)(2); 163(h)(3)(B). 
 66 Id. § 121(a). The limit on the allowed exclusion is $250,000 for single taxpayers and $500,000 
for married taxpayers filing jointly. Id. § 121(b). Moreover, to be eligible for the exclusion, the bor-
rower must have used the home as his or her primary residence for at least two of the five years prior 
to the sale or exchange. Id. § 121(a). 
 67 Id. § 166(a). 
 68 Id. § 1001(a). The computation for gain is the amount realized minus the adjusted basis in the 
property. Id. This section defines the amount realized as the value of all money and property received 
by the seller in the sale or exchange. Id. § 1001(b). Basis in property under § 1012 is the cost that the 
seller originally paid to acquire the property. Id. § 1012(a). Taxpayers are able to adjust their basis in 
property for expenditures incurred in relation to the property. Id. § 1016(a). The result is the taxpay-
er’s adjusted basis in the property. See id. § 1011(a) (defining adjusted basis as the basis from § 1012 
adjusted as allowed by § 1016). 
 69 Brad Cripe & Katrina Mantzke, Tax Implications of Mortgage Foreclosures, 84 PRAC. TAX 
STRATEGIES 324, 324 (2010). 
 70 See id. (distinguishing between recourse and nonrecourse mortgages). State property laws may 
affect whether a mortgage is recourse or nonrecourse. Id. at 325. For example, in jurisdictions where 
laws prohibit lenders from pursuing borrowers for outstanding debt after foreclosure, mortgages must 
be nonrecourse. Id. 
 71 Gomez, supra note 50, at 76. 
 72 Id. 
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ting obligation to pay the amount back.73 Nonetheless, a foreclosure sale is 
treated as a sale or exchange of property and, therefore, is a taxable event.74 
In the case of nonrecourse mortgages, the borrower’s amount realized 
from the foreclosure is the entire remaining debt, regardless of the property’s 
value.75 Thus, the borrower must recognize a gain of the amount of the mort-
gage minus the amount the borrower invested to buy and maintain the proper-
ty, known as the “basis.”76 A borrower may be able to avoid including the gain 
in income to the extent it is not over $250,000.77 Foreclosures on properties 
with recourse mortgages, on the other hand, require a two-prong analysis.78 
Because recourse mortgages mean that the borrower may still be personally 
liable for a deficiency, a lender may choose to pursue any remainder owed af-
ter the sale or forgive the debt.79 If the lender chooses to forgive the remaining 
amount, then that amount will be considered income from the cancellation of 
debt.80 Therefore, a borrower may have taxable income if the sale price ex-
                                                                                                                           
 73 See Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983) (explaining that a loan is not income because 
the taxpayer must pay the amount back); Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Daniel L. Simmons, A Field 
Guide to Cancellation of Debt Income, 63 TAX LAW. 415, 417 (2010) (clarifying that, although a loan 
increases the borrower’s assets, this increase is countered by the corresponding obligation to pay it 
back); see also Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431 (defining income as “accessions to wealth, clearly 
realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion”). Loans do not qualify as accessions 
to wealth due to the offsetting obligation to repay them. McMahon & Simmons, supra. 
 74 Medlin v. Comm’r, 86 T.C.M (CCH) 141 (2003) (citing Helvering v. Hammel, 331 U.S. 504 
(1941)); Cripe & Mantzke, supra note 69, at 327. 
 75 McMahon & Simmons, supra note 73, at 427. This is the same treatment given to sales of 
property encumbered by debt in which the buyer agrees to take on the debt as part of the purchase. Id. 
“Amount realized” is defined by the IRC to include the amount of money received on the disposition 
of a property. 26 U.S.C. § 1001(b). 
 76 Katherine M. Hetherington & Timothy R. Hurley, Selling Principal Residence When Debt 
Exceeds Fair Market Value, 90 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 52, 58 (2013). For example, if a lender fore-
closes on a borrower’s home with an outstanding nonrecourse mortgage of $100,000 and an adjusted 
basis of $50,000, the amount realized to the borrower is the entire $100,000. See id. (providing exam-
ples of amount realized and gain from foreclosures with nonrecourse mortgages). The gain to the 
borrower would be the amount realized in excess of the adjusted basis, or $50,000. See id. (specifying 
that gain is the amount realized minus the adjusted basis). 
 77 See 26 U.S.C. § 121. Borrowers must have used the home as their principal residence for a total 
of two years within the preceding five-year period prior to the foreclosure to qualify for this exclusion. 
Id. If borrowers in the above example had met this requirement, they would be able to exclude the 
$50,000 of gain. See Hetherington & Hurley, supra note 76 (explaining how to calculate a borrower’s 
basis). 
 78 Hetherington & Hurley, supra note 76. 
 79 See Gomez, supra note 50, at 76 (explaining that because the maximum a lender can recover in 
foreclosure is the value of the home, recourse mortgages allow lenders to pursue any remainder in 
debt); Hetherington & Hurley, supra note 76, at 53 (explaining that when a lender decides to eliminate 
or lessen the borrower’s remaining debt after foreclosure, the borrower must recognize income from 
the cancellation of debt). 
 80 See Gomez, supra note 50, at 74–75. Some states have anti-deficiency statutes that prohibit 
lenders from pursuing borrowers for deficiencies after the foreclosure sale. Cripe & Mantzke, supra 
note 69, at 325. Although the borrower still “owes” the deficiency, if a state statute prohibits collec-
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ceeds the basis, and, further, may have to recognize cancellation of debt in-
come if the lender forgives any remaining deficiency.81 The borrower may ex-
clude from income the gain from the foreclosure sale of the home under Sec-
tion 121 and similarly exclude the gain from the cancellation of debt under 
Section 108.82 
In 2007, faced with the aftershock of the financial crisis as borrowers be-
gan to default, Congress passed the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act, 
which amended Section 108.83 This provision allowed individual borrowers 
who defaulted on their mortgages to exclude up to $1,000,000 that would oth-
erwise have counted as income from the cancellation of debt.84 The Act ex-
pired at the end of 2009 but Congress extended it several times.85 Currently, 
the provision applies only to debts forgiven before the start of 2018 or to debts 
that were entered into by written agreement prior to that date, and the law has 
yet to be extended again.86 
D. Using Law and Economics to Attack the Problem 
Law and economics is a lens through which one may analyze the effect of 
legal rules.87 A key assumption in this area is that the introduction of legal 
rules will affect people’s behavior.88 This is predicated on the assumption that 
                                                                                                                           
tion of that debt, then that amount will still constitute cancellation of debt income, because the bor-
rower no longer needs to pay the deficiency. Gomez, supra note 50, at 74–75. 
 81 Hetherington & Hurley, supra note 76, at 58. For example, if a lender forecloses on a borrow-
er’s home with a recourse mortgage of $100,000 and an adjusted basis of $30,000 and the home only 
sells for $50,000, then there is a two-step analysis in calculating tax liability. See id. First, because the 
foreclosure sale price is in excess of the adjusted basis by $20,000, the borrower would realize that 
differential in gain. See id. If the lender then chose to forgive the remaining $50,000 of debt, the bor-
rower would realize that $50,000 in cancellation of debt income. See id. 
 82 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 108(a) (listing instances in which cancellation of debt is not included in gross 
income, such as if the debt is qualified principle residence indebtedness discharged before January 1, 
2018), 121(a) (explaining that, to exclude gain from the sale of property, the borrower must have used 
the home as a principal residence for two of the preceding five years). 
 83 Id. § 108(a)(1)(E); McMahon & Simmons, supra note 73, at 467. 
 84 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(E); McMahon & Simmons, supra note 73, at 467. This only applies to 
“qualified principal residence indebtedness.” Id. 
 85 Hetherington & Hurley, supra note 76, at 54. 
 86 See 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(E) (specifying that, in order for the forgiveness of a debt to be eligi-
ble for exclusion up to $2,000,000, a debt must have been cancelled prior to the beginning of 2018 or 
stem from a contract entered into before 2018). So far, the IRS website has not been updated to indi-
cate that this provision will be extended. Home Foreclosure and Debt Cancellation, INTERNAL REVE-
NUE SERV. (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/home-foreclosure-and-debt-cancellation 
[https://perma.cc/5CUA-B2HW]. 
 87 DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH LAW AND WHY IT 
MATTERS 8 (2000). See generally NYU School of Law, The Forum: The Method Behind the Madness 
(1): Explaining Law and Economics, YOUTUBE (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
2cFTiSeM4cA [https://perma.cc/Q5J6-ZUEU] (documenting a presentation by Max E. Greenberg, a 
contracts professor at NYU School of Law, on the topic of law and economics). 
 88 NYU School of Law, supra note 87. 
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people act rationally to further their self-interest.89 This does not necessarily 
mean that every individual engages in some numerical cost-benefit analysis 
(although they might), but rather, that people make decisions based on a broad 
understanding of whether such decision will benefit or hurt them.90 
Much of modern law and economics can be attributed to what has become 
known as the “Coase Theorem.”91 Stated simply, this proposition stands for the 
idea that by disregarding transaction costs, the original legal assignment of 
property rights between two conflicting parties would be irrelevant because 
both would be able to reach an efficient bargain as to the property’s use.92 Of 
course, in the real world, transaction costs are often high, which may cause 
market inefficiency.93 In this case, laws may be formulated to achieve the effi-
cient result that would have been reached without those costs.94 Because bar-
gaining in a transaction bears costs, such as legal fees, this Note disregards 
those costs and examines how rational lenders and borrowers would respond to 
financial incentives and bargain over legal rules that affect the use of a home in 
foreclosure to avoid a zombie mortgage.95 
                                                                                                                           
 89 FRIEDMAN, supra note 87, at 8. Rationality in this context does not mean that people make the 
morally “right” choices—one might “rationally” engage in illegal activities because his or her abilities 
make that choice the most logical option. See id. (discussing how thieves may choose their profession 
due to their unique set of abilities). 
 90 See id. (elaborating that rationality does not mean that a criminal necessarily calculates the 
percentage chance he or she has of being caught, but, rather, chooses to break the law because it fits 
the criminal’s skill set or abilities). 
 91 FRANCESCO PARISI, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 47 (2013). In 1960, Ronald 
Coase, a British economist, published “The Problem of Social Cost” in the University of Chicago Law 
School’s Journal of Law and Economics. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 
1 (1960); JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 2 (6th ed. 2016). Coase was 
an Economics professor at the University of Chicago Law School and editor of the Journal of Law and 
Economics from 1964 to 1982. About Ronald Coase, THE RONALD COASE INST. (Feb. 3, 2018), 
https://www.coase.org/aboutronaldcoase.htm [https://perma.cc/C7BE-B99L]. Coase’s influential work 
in the discussion of property rights and transaction costs led to him winning the Nobel Prize in Eco-
nomics in 1991. Id. 
 92 Coase, supra note 91, at 8; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10 (8th ed. 
2011). Coase had expressed his opposition to the formulation of his ideas as a theorem because he 
believed many scholars misinterpret the concept. The University of Chicago, Ronald Coase: Centen-
nial Coase Lecture, YOUTUBE (Apr. 20, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DIrftpTfy
YQ&t=2455s [https://perma.cc/9V4C-GKGP]. Coase explained that a world without transaction costs 
does not exist and describing the world as such is fallacious. Id. Rather, Coase stated, one should 
disregard transaction costs in a particular transaction, rather than the world as a whole, to properly 
apply his proposition. Id. 
 93 Coase, supra note 91, at 15. 
 94 Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 109 
(1979). 
 95 See infra notes 98–236 and accompanying text. 
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II. FEDERAL LAW MAY NOT BE THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM: 
A DISCUSSION ON THE DESIRABILITY OF STATE LAW 
A. The Problem with Forced Vesting in Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy courts that have addressed forced vesting are split on whether 
a debtor may forcibly vest title to a creditor in a Chapter 13 plan and focus on 
two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code in their analysis: sections 1325(a) and 
1322(b).96 The split may be illustrated by examining two bankruptcy court de-
cisions from Massachusetts that reach opposite conclusions.97 The In re 
Sagendorph decision used both sections to justify forced vesting as part of a 
Chapter 13 plan.98 Section 1322(b)(9) allows a plan to vest property in an enti-
ty, and Section 1325(a)(5)(C) provides that a debtor may surrender secured 
property to the holder of the security interest under a plan.99 The bankruptcy 
court noted that surrendering property to a party is a preliminary step in vest-
ing title to that party, and held that forced vesting was statutorily authorized by 
the Bankruptcy Code, even if it violated state law, in accordance with bank-
ruptcy’s fresh start policy.100 
The In re Tosi decision took a divergent approach to the Sagendorph 
analysis.101 In Tosi, the debtor attempted to include a provision in his plan that 
would vest title in his mortgaged property to his lender if the debtor failed to 
sell his home within three months of confirmation of the plan.102 The court 
examined whether the proposed plan may be viewed as one that surrenders 
property to the lender under § 1325(a)(5)(C).103 The court found that surrender 
is meant to allow a lender to use all of its property rights in the home.104 Vest-
                                                                                                                           
 96 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1325 (2012) (listing what a plan shall and may include). 
 97 Compare In re Sagendorph, No. 14-41675-MSH, 2015 WL 3867955, at *1, *4 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. June 22, 2015), rev’d, In re Sagendorph, 562 B.R. 545 (D. Mass. 2017) (ruling that surrender is 
a preliminary step in vesting), with In re Tosi, 546 B.R. 487, 494 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2016) (holding that 
forced vesting is not compatible with the Bankruptcy Code). 
 98 In re Sagendorph, 2015 WL 3867955, at *4. 
 99 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1325. 
 100 In re Sagendorph, 2015 WL 3867955, at *4–5. The court stated that Congress would not have 
included both provisions in the Bankruptcy Code if it meant for vesting to be synonymous with sur-
render. Id. at 4. The court also noted that, although Massachusetts does not allow for transfer through 
forced vesting, federal law supersedes state law, and thus permits such a transfer. Id. (citing Butner v. 
United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)). 
 101 See Tosi, 546 B.R. at 495 (finding that forced vesting is not permitted). 
 102 Id. at 489. In this case, the court granted the lender relief from the automatic stay so that it 
could initiate foreclosure proceedings on the property. Id. at 491. The automatic stay occurs in bank-
ruptcy and prevents a debtor’s creditors from enforcing any liens they have on the debtor’s property. 
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4). Here, the debtor did not object to the lender foreclosing on the property but 
requested that, if the plan was confirmed and the foreclosure did not occur within three months of 
confirmation, title would still vest in the lender. Tosi, 546 B.R. at 491. The court rejected the debtor’s 
proposal. Id. at 496. 
 103 Tosi, 546 B.R. at 491. 
 104 Id. at 493. 
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ing, however, effectively changes the lender’s legal relationship with the prop-
erty, thus depriving it of some of the rights it has as a mortgagee, such as the 
right to foreclose.105 Therefore, the court held that surrender and vesting could 
not both be invoked in the plan because doing so would be inconsistent.106 
Courts have not viewed the case for forced vesting during Chapter 13 
bankruptcies favorably on appeal, instead holding that forced vesting is incon-
sistent with the Bankruptcy Code.107 Still, district courts sympathetic to the 
financial situations of debtors with underwater homes have voiced support for 
the possibility of enabling forced vesting through other provisions in the Bank-
ruptcy Code.108 Some commentators on the subject have made similar sugges-
tions.109 Another has called for Congress to amend the Bankruptcy Code to 
make forced vesting possible.110 Regardless of the potential solutions available 
in bankruptcy and their potential desirability, they are nonetheless contingent 
on filing for bankruptcy.111 Borrowers with mortgages in excess of their 
homes’ values filed for bankruptcy after the properties had already become 
encumbered by more debt than they were worth.112 Bankruptcy reform may 
                                                                                                                           
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 494. 
 107 See In re Sagendorph, 562 B.R. at 558; Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Watt, No. 3:14-CV-02051-
AA, 2015 WL 1879680, at *1, *7 (D. Or. Apr. 22, 2015). 
 108 In re Sagendorph, 562 B.R. at 558. 
 109 See Boyack & Berger, supra note 6, at 473 (advocating for the use of § 363 sales to eradicate 
zombie mortgages); Kate E. Nicholson, A Future for Forced Vesting? Developments in Case Law and 
an Alternative Approach, 2017 ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. LAW 14 (advocating for the use of the 
§ 1325(a)(5)(B) cramdown provision to fix the problem). A “cramdown” describes when a Chapter 13 
plan is confirmed over a creditor’s objection, and that creditor receives a stream of payments that 
equal the value of the claim. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 469 (2004) (describing 
cramdown provisions under the Bankruptcy Code and their implications); see also Mark J. Thompson 
& Katie M. McDonough, Lost in Translation: Till v. SCS Credit Corp. and the Mistaken Transfer of a 
Consumer Bankruptcy Repayment Formula to Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 893 (2015) (discussing cramdowns under Chapter 13 and analyzing how courts have applied 
the Till decision to Chapter 11); Jay A. Kroese, Note, Undersecured Residential Mortgage Cramdown 
Under Chapter 13: Receiving the Attention of Both the Supreme Court and Congress, 18 J. CORP. L. 
737, 741 (1993) (providing an example of a cramdown provision in a Chapter 13 plan and how it 
applies to home mortgages). 
 110 See McQuade, supra note 6, at 534 (calling for Congress to amend the Bankruptcy Code). 
 111 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (describing the requirements to be eligible to be a debtor under Chap-
ter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code). 
 112 See, e.g, In re Tosi, 546 B.R. at 489 (denying a plan that force vested title in a lender); In re 
Sagendorph, 2015 WL 3867955, at *2; In re Zair, 535 B.R. 15, 17 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d, 
HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Zair, 550 B.R. 188 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (confirming a plan that vested title in 
a lender); In re Stewart, 536 B.R. 273, 274 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2015) (approving a plan that vested title 
in a lender because the lender failed to object); In re Williams, 542 B.R. 514, 517 (Bankr. D. Kan. 
2015) (denying a debtor’s motion to confirm a plan vesting title in a lender); In re Watt, 520 B.R. 834, 
835–36 (Bankr. D. Or. 2014), vacated Watt, 2015 WL 1879680 (confirming a plan that vested title in 
a bank over the bank’s objection); In re Rosa, 495 B.R. 522, 523 (Bankr. D. Haw. 2013) (approving a 
Chapter 13 plan that vested title in a mortgagee because the mortgagee did not object). 
1294 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:1279 
solve problems with existing zombie mortgages but does not prevent the zom-
bie from rising.113 
B. Eliminating the Cause of the Problem Through State Law 
Although issues concerning property implicate both state and federal law, 
state law initially determines one’s rights and interests with respect to proper-
ty.114 Federal law becomes relevant when a federal statute, such as the Bank-
ruptcy Code, affects property rights or interests.115 For purposes of this discus-
sion, federal law is not relevant because state law determines the initial rights 
to property that one may hold in a transaction.116 
The current responses by states to the zombie mortgage problem vary de-
pending on each state’s perception of the issue’s severity.117 In New York, leg-
islatures issued laws introducing duties on lenders prior to foreclosure, includ-
ing maintaining the property and reporting abandoned properties to a regis-
try.118 Conversely, Portland, Oregon’s legislature did not view zombie mort-
                                                                                                                           
 113 See, e.g., In re Tosi, 546 B.R. at 489 (involving a property that was already in an unfavorable 
condition); In re Sagendorph, 2015 WL 3867955, at *2 (same). Because bankruptcy would only be 
applicable to those who actually file for it, forced vesting would only be applicable if a zombie mort-
gage already existed on the property at issue. See, e.g., In re Tosi, 546 B.R. at 489 (involving a plain-
tiff who filed for bankruptcy); In re Sagendorph, 2015 WL 3867955, at *2 (same). 
 114 See Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 54 (1999) (noting that state law provided that a spend-
thrift trust was shielded from creditors); Butner, 440 U.S. at 55 (stating that property interests stem 
from state law); Morgan v. Comm’r, 309 U.S. 78, 80–81 (1940) (stating that state law creates certain 
rights); see also Mian, supra note 15, at 2588 (explaining how state law creates a distinction between 
judicial and non-judicial foreclosure states that affects the lender/borrower relationships with respect to a 
home). 
 115 See Drye, 528 U.S. at 54 (explaining how the IRC determines whether a state-provided right is 
considered a property right, or even considered property itself, for purposes of § 6321 of the code). 
Section 6321 provides that a failure to pay taxes may lead to a federal government lien against the 
taxpayer’s property. 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (2017). The Drye case has been subject to some criticism that it 
undermines state sovereignty. See Timothy R. West, Drye v. United States: Limiting the Traditional 
State Right to Define Property, 69 UMKC L. REV. 909, 909–10 (2001). 
 116 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183 (West 2018) (listing laws that deal with the aliena-
tion of land). 
 117 See, e.g., Jim Redden, Wheeler Pauses Hales Campaign to Foreclose on ‘Zombie’ Homes, 
PORTLAND TRIB., Jan. 4, 2018, http://pamplinmedia.com/pt/9-news/382786-270773-wheeler-pauses-
hales-campaign-to-foreclose-on-zombie-homes [https://perma.cc/CT4F-34PN] (discussing approaches 
of cities in Oregon); Michelle Conlin, Special Report: The Latest Foreclosure Horror: The Zombie 
Title, REUTERS (Jan. 10, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-foreclosures-zombies/special-
report-the-latest-foreclosure-horror-the-zombie-title-idUSBRE9090G920130110 [https://perma.cc/
59JH-X6VQ] (discussing approaches of cities in Ohio); Ben Lane, New York Announces New Re-
quirements for Maintenance of Zombie Homes, HOUSINGWIRE (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.housing
wire.com/articles/38149-new-york-announces-new-requirements-for-maintenance-of-zombie-homes 
[https://perma.cc/22RH-DSLM] (discussing approaches of cities in New York). 
 118 Lane, supra note 117. Lenders in New York have an obligation to report their efforts at main-
taining these properties to the New York Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”). Id. Upon the 
NYDFS’s finding that a lender failed to maintain a property, the department may issue fines of $500 
per day for each property in violation. Id. The law proved to be no mere threat, as one lender was 
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gages as a priority, and the city discontinued its attempts to get rid of them.119 
Cities in Ohio took a much harsher approach to dealing with the problem by 
penalizing borrowers if they fail to remedy the problems associated with their 
abandoned properties.120 These responses all deal with zombie mortgages after 
one is already present, however, rather than addressing the initial cause of the 
problem.121 
Much of the shock to borrowers who find out they have title to these 
properties stems from their belief that they had “abandoned” the property.122 
Borrowers who abandon their homes often do so for economic reasons because 
their debt exceeds the home’s equity.123 Although they may believe that they 
abandoned their homes, based on a layperson’s interpretation of abandonment, 
that term actually has legal significance.124 State statutes determine what con-
stitutes legal abandonment of a property, which may permit the state to act to 
maintain the property, but does not relinquish the owner’s title to the proper-
                                                                                                                           
fined $119,000 for not maintaining a property for 238 days after it had been registered as abandoned. 
Ben Lane, NYDFS Hits PHH with Six-Figure Fine for Failing to Maintain Single Zombie Home, 
HOUSINGWIRE (Sep. 28, 2016), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/42089-nydfs-hits-phh-with-
six-figure-fine-for-failing-to-maintain-single-zombie-home [https://perma.cc/FHE3-SBYU]. Some 
homes are in such terrible condition that banks may even choose to fund demolition, rather than mak-
ing attempts to sell the property. Capital Region Land Bank Approves Demolition of Niskayuna 
“Zombie Property,” CBS6ALBANY (Dec. 21, 2017), http://cbs6albany.com/news/local/capital-region-
land-bank-approves-demolition-of-niskayuna-zombie-property [https://perma.cc/H32N-JAQL]. The 
condition of the home was the result of a long foreclosure action, preventing the property from being 
fixed or sold. Id. A 2016 report showed that New York had one of the highest numbers of zombie 
mortgages, second only to New Jersey. Kelsey Ramírez, Strong Housing Market Helps Reduce Lin-
gering Foreclosure Inventory, HOUSINGWIRE (May 19, 2016), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/
37068-strong-housing-market-helps-reduce-lingering-foreclosure-inventory [https://perma.cc/HHD6-
ZNXE]. At the time of the article, there were over 3,300 zombie properties in New York, surpassed 
only by the approximately 4000 properties in New Jersey. Id. 
 119 Redden, supra note 117. Whereas former Mayor Charlie Hales pushed for more pressure on 
landlords to maintain their properties through the threat of foreclosure, Mayor Wheeler did not regard 
it as a priority, noting the costs and length that are involved. Id. 
 120 See Conlin, supra note 117 (noting that some cities impose probation and even jail time for 
borrowers who fail to maintain their properties). 
 121 See Redden, supra note 117 (discussing Oregon’s approaches to zombie mortgages); Conlin, 
supra note 117 (discussing Ohio’s approaches to zombie mortgages); Lane, supra note 117 (discuss-
ing New York’s approaches to zombie mortgages). 
 122 See Conlin, supra note 117 (explaining that a large cause of the rise in zombie mortgages was 
that borrowers abandoned their homes expecting to lose them). 
 123 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 363 (2010) (ex-
plaining that properties that do not have a positive value, i.e., properties that would sell for less than 
the owners owe on their loans, will probably be abandoned by the owners). In fact, in a case study of 
New York, researchers found that nearly all abandoned real estate was encumbered by debt that ex-
ceeded the property’s value. Id. This suggests that borrowers chose to default on their mortgages when 
their home values plummeted. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at 403 (explain-
ing that the most significant factor in a borrower’s decision to default is “negative equity”). 
 124 See Peñalver, supra note 21, at 196 (explaining that there is a difference between the use of 
“abandon” in personal and legal contexts). 
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ty.125 Although one may physically abandon a home, one may not abandon le-
gal title to the home in the same way.126 For example, In Pocono Springs Civic 
Association, Inc. v. MacKenzie, a married couple attempted to convince the 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania that their extensive actions of refusing to pay 
taxes and continuous attempts to sell their land constituted an abandonment of 
property.127 Pennsylvania law dictates that abandoning title can only occur 
when an owner willingly gave up “all right, title, claim, and possession.”128 
The Pocono court held that Pennsylvania law did not allow for the abandon-
ment of property to which owners have title.129 Thus, there is a distinction be-
tween abandoning a home and abandoning title to a home in the context of 
zombie mortgages.130 
The incentives of both lenders and borrowers in the realm of foreclosures 
and abandonment are largely economic.131 Borrowers choose to default when 
the mortgage debt exceeds their home’s value and lenders choose to stop fore-
closure when doing so would be less costly than completing it.132 Economic 
incentives may encourage states to establish laws dealing with foreclosures or 
                                                                                                                           
 125 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 426.205 (West 2012) (describing abandonment as occurring 
when the property has not been legally occupied for 45 consecutive days and two or more elements 
are met from a list of factors relating to the property’s blighted appearance); Abandoned and Blighted 
Property Conservatorship Act, 68 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1103; 1105 (West 2016) 
(providing that property is abandoned when, among other factors, its appearance is unsightly, it drives 
down property values, and becomes a danger to the public); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 6.13.050 
(West 1987) (providing that a home will have the presumption of being abandoned if the owner has 
been absent for at least six months, unless the owner files a declaration that he or she has not aban-
doned the property); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 846.102 (West 2017) (providing a list of factors that courts 
must consider in determining whether a property is abandoned, including its physical appearance and 
its dangerousness to the public). 
 126 Boyack & Berger, supra note 6, at 455 (explaining that only a title transfer can stop liabilities 
and obligations from accruing on the home). 
 127 Pocono Springs Civic Ass’n, Inc. v. MacKenzie, 667 A.2d 233, 234 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). 
Beginning in 1986, the MacKenzies had made a variety of attempts to rid themselves of the property. 
Id. at 448. Among other things, they (1) tried to gift the property; (2) stopped paying property taxes, 
resulting in two failed attempts by the Tax Claim Bureau to sell the land; (3) expressly indicated their 
desire to abandon the land; and (4) refrained from visiting or maintaining the land for nearly nine 
years. Id. 
 128 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Wetmore, 447 A.2d 1012, 1014 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)). 
 129 Id. at 236. 
 130 See Boyack & Berger, supra note 6, at 455 (stating that abandonment does not remove legal 
liabilities and obligations from homeowners); supra note 125 and accompanying text (providing ex-
amples of how states define abandonment). 
 131 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at 403 (stating that the most significant 
predictor of mortgage default for borrowers is when a home has negative equity, i.e. when the debt 
owed on the mortgage exceeds the value of the home); Clark, supra note 3, at 801–02 (explaining that 
lenders typically stop foreclosure proceedings when the costs outweighed the returns that foreclosing 
and selling the property would bring). 
 132 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 15 (explaining how lenders con-
duct an analysis to determine whether foreclosure is worthwhile); supra note 131 and accompanying 
text (explaining the incentives for borrowers and lenders to default and foreclose). 
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abandoned properties.133 Pennsylvania, for example, enacted the Abandoned 
and Blighted Property Conservatorship Act in 2009 in response to the adverse 
economic consequences of these properties.134 The statute sets forth a five-part 
inquiry as to whether a property is abandoned and there is a need for a conser-
vator to temporarily take over and manage the property.135 A key element is 
that the “abandoned” property cannot be in foreclosure.136 So, for zombie 
properties in which a foreclosure is no longer pending because a lender has 
stopped it, this prong is seemingly met.137 Although a conservatorship can ad-
dress the problems resulting from an abandoned and decaying home, the 
homeowner’s financial problems may remain, as the statute expressly states 
that homeowners are still liable for all monetary obligations such as taxes and 
mortgage payments, whether they arose before or after the conservator’s ap-
                                                                                                                           
 133 See, e.g., tit. 68, § 1102 (recognizing the detrimental effect that these abandoned properties 
have on communities and noting the need to appoint a conservator to maintain the property); Save 
New Jersey Homes Act of 2008, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-37 (West 2019) (explaining how foreclo-
sure effectively deprives homeowners of their most significant assets and discussing the adverse eco-
nomic effect that a foreclosure has on surrounding properties), repealed by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-
48 (creating a sunset provision in 2008 to render the Save New Jersey Homes Act of 2008 inoperative 
on January 1, 2011). Whatever the effects of the Home Act were, they were not sufficient in dealing 
with zombie mortgages, because New Jersey remains the state with the highest number of them. See 
Ramírez, supra note 118 (noting that New Jersey had just over 4000 zombie mortgages as of May 
2016). 
 134 See tit. 68, § 1102 (explaining the economic purpose behind the Act). The statute indicates that 
these properties diminish the values of neighboring properties. Id. Pennsylvania’s legislature saw that 
communities have an important economic role in the state. Id. As such, if a conservator is appointed, 
that party will be responsible for preventing further harm to the property so that it may have some 
economic value in the future. Id. 
 135 Id. § 1105. A conservator is an individual or entity tasked with bringing the abandoned home 
into conformity with all municipal requirements with respect to homes. Id. §§ 1105–1106. Under the 
statute, a nongovernmental entity with the oldest lien on the home (often the lender that provided the 
original mortgage) is given the first opportunity to be appointed the home’s conservator by a court. Id. 
§ 1105. Upon refusal or a lack of ability to become conservator by such a lienholder, the statute then 
considers appointing nonprofit corporations and governmental units as conservators. Id. Once ap-
pointed by a court, the conservator may obtain a lien against the property for the costs incurred in 
preserving and maintaining it. Id. Before a conservator can be appointed, a “party in interest” may 
request that a specific conservator be appointed. Id. § 1104. “Parties in interest” may include the prop-
erty’s owner, lienholders, or neighbors within 2,000 feet. Id. § 1103. Appointment of a conservator 
depends on the home being abandoned. Id. §§ 1103, 1105. According to the statute, a building must 
have been unoccupied for a minimum of twelve months, the owner must not have sold the property (in 
good faith), the property must not be in foreclosure, the owner must not have acquired the property 
within the prior six months, and a the building must satisfy a fifth prong in which at least three ele-
ments must be met. § 1105. These elements include consideration of whether the home (1) has be-
come a “public nuisance,” (2) needs significant maintenance and has not been maintained within the 
past year, (3) is not suitable for people to reside in it, or (4) attracts illegal activities. Id. 
 136 Id. § 1105 More specifically, the home cannot be in foreclosure by “an individual or nongov-
ernmental entity.” Id. Therefore, it may be that governmental foreclosures would not be subject to this 
statute. See id. (omitting governmental entities). 
 137 See id. (stating that a home is not abandoned if it is subject to a foreclosure); Clark, supra note 
3, at 801–02 (explaining that zombie properties arose when lenders stopped foreclosure proceedings). 
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pointment.138 Thus, Pennsylvania’s statutory solution does not extinguish the 
liabilities incurred by borrowers who are bitten by a zombie mortgage.139 
Wisconsin has also enacted legislation to deal with abandoned properties 
that were subject to mortgages.140 The statute provides that a mortgage holder 
who wishes to foreclose on an abandoned property may bring an action to do 
so upon a finding that the property is “abandoned” as defined by the statute.141 
Upon a finding of abandonment, the court may authorize the lender to fore-
close and sell the property.142 In 2015, in Bank of New York Mellon v. Carson, 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin construed the statute to require the lender to 
sell the property within a statutorily prescribed time frame.143 The court looked 
to legislative history indicating that abandoned properties decrease property 
values and thus lower communities’ tax revenues.144 It mentioned that absent 
                                                                                                                           
 138 Tit. 68, § 1107. The statute gives the conservator an ownership interest in the property as well 
as legal control over it (permitting the conservator to carry out his or her duties), but does not give the 
conservator title to the property, which is actual legal ownership of the property. See id. (mentioning 
that the conservator does not get title); Boyack & Berger, supra note 6, at 455 (explaining how chang-
ing who holds title to a property will shift who is responsible for the liabilities). 
 139 See Boyack & Berger, supra note 6, at 455 (explaining that the homeowner is not excused 
from mortgage payments and liabilities). 
 140 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 846.102 (explaining the that process lenders may go through to en-
force their liens if the property has been abandoned). 
 141 Id. The statute also notes that, along with mortgage lenders, cities, towns, villages, and coun-
ties where the abandoned property is located may also bring an action. Id. Establishing abandonment 
involves analyzing a list of factors and determining if they apply to the property at issue. Id. Some of 
the factors include damaged or missing doors or windows, the prevalence of trash on the property, two 
or more reports to police that illegal activity is occurring on the property, and an overall lack of safety 
of the property. Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Carson, 859 N.W.2d 422, 429 (Wis. 2015). In Carson, a lender filed a 
foreclosure action against a borrower who had already abandoned the home after defaulting on mort-
gage payments. Id. at 424. After the lower court entered judgment in favor of the lender to foreclose, 
the lender did not sell or maintain the property, and municipal fees began accumulating to the borrow-
er. Id. at 425. The borrower then filed suit, asking the lower court to amend the judgment to require 
the lender to sell the property five weeks after the amended judgment, as required under the statute’s 
language. Id. The statutory language provides that the court shall enter judgment and the plaintiff can 
satisfy the judgment in one of two ways. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 846.102. It also provides that the plaintiff 
shall hold a sale that may take place after five weeks from entry of judgment or it shall release the 
mortgage lien and vacate the foreclosure judgment. Id. The court denied the request, stating that the 
statute did not allow the court to do so. Carson, 859 N.W.2d at 425. On appeal, the appellate court 
reversed the decision and the lender appealed to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Id. at 425–26. The 
state supreme court found that the statutory language allowed courts to require a sale to take place. Id. 
at 429. It reasoned that, because the statute uses “shall” and “may” in the same section, the legislature 
must have intended them to have different meanings, supporting the notion that “shall” is a mandatory 
provision. Id. at 428. The court then evaluated whether the statute allowed it to require the sale to 
occur within some time limit and found that it did. Id. at 429. The lender argued that another Wiscon-
sin statute gives a lender five years to sell the property. Id. at 429–30. The court disagreed, holding 
that the statute indicated that the legislature wanted sales to move quickly. Id. at 430. 
 144 Id. at 430–31. The court stated that allowing five years for a sale to take place would under-
mine the legislative intent backing the statute. Id. 
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time constraints, lenders would be able to leave properties in a state of legal 
uncertainty.145 Nonetheless, the statute presupposes that a property is already 
abandoned and in unfavorable condition.146 Although such a statute may be an 
example of a proper response to the effect of zombie mortgages, it does not do 
much to prevent the emergence of zombie mortgages altogether.147 
The root of the problem lies within the relationship between the borrower 
and the lender, since they are the parties subject to the mortgage agreement.148 
Given the strong economic incentives that guide both parties in their respective 
decisions to default or foreclose, both would be inclined to agree upon alterna-
tive arrangements if their economic interests were better served by doing so.149 
Of course, if transaction costs are too high, an efficient bargain may not re-
sult.150 By disregarding these costs, it is possible to examine what an efficient 
outcome would look like and by extension, discover laws that would achieve 
that result.151 These laws would overcome the need for judicial oversight be-
cause such oversight would not impact the efficient outcome.152 Where parties 
                                                                                                                           
 145 Id. 
 146 See § 846.102 (requiring that the property be abandoned and listing physical factors that con-
tribute to a finding that the property is abandoned). 
 147 See id. (requiring the property to be abandoned). The requirement that the property already be 
in an unfavorable state causes the statute to apply to properties with mortgages that can already be 
classified as zombie mortgages, rather than preventing zombie mortgages from arising in the first 
place. See id.; Clark, supra note 3, at 795 (explaining how zombie mortgage occur when abandoned 
properties are not foreclosed upon). 
 148 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at 402–03 (describing how borrowers 
defaulted on their loans and how lenders increased foreclosures during the financial crisis). 
 149 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 15 (discussing the equity anal-
yses that lenders perform before deciding whether or not to foreclose); Coase, supra note 91, at 8 
(discussing the optimal and efficient outcomes that may result through bargain). 
 150 See Coase, supra note 91, at 15. 
 151 See Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules—A Com-
ment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 69 (1968) (discussing how certain rules may result in efficient market out-
comes). 
 152 See Coase, supra note 91, at 8 (discussing how bargaining in some scenarios would not need 
court involvement); see, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219 (N.Y. 1970); JEFFREY L. 
HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS: POSITIVE, NORMATIVE AND BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES 160 (2d. 
ed. 2007) (discussing Boomer and how it may illustrate the Coase Theorem). In Boomer, a cement 
company’s operations resulted in pollution of some nearby land. 26 N.Y.2d at 222. The landowners 
filed suit against the company, seeking an injunction to prevent it from continuing to pollute. Id. The 
Court of Appeals of New York framed the issue as a question of whether the court should use an in-
junction to resolve a private matter or should make its decision based on public policy. Id. The court 
noted that public concerns with air pollution might be dealt with through regulation by federal and 
state governments. Id. Nonetheless, the court distinguished policy-oriented regulation and private 
lawsuits. Id. at 223. The court further stated that it is uncommon for courts to decide these private 
cases on the basis of public desires that exceed the rights and issues in the lawsuit. Id. Moreover, it 
noted that pollution regulation would require a balancing of the economic effects of regulation and the 
effect of pollution on public health, something that is not within the scope of a court. Id. The court 
stated that pollution issues as a whole should be left for governments to deal with, whereas private 
litigation resolution is to be done through the judicial system. Id. It concluded that the injunction 
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with economic incentives place values on certain rights, there is potential for 
bargain regardless of judicial intervention.153 
C. Establishing the Right of Forced Vesting Through Legal Rules 
 The initial question that states must consider in assigning rights is to 
whom to assign the right, or “entitlement.”154 Moreover, upon deciding to 
whom a right should be allocated, states must then provide a mechanism to 
enforce those rights.155 There are at least two viable ways of enforcing these 
entitlements: through property rules and through liability rules.156 In enforce-
ment of a right using property rules, one who wishes to infringe on the right 
would need to pay the right holder to purchase the ability to do so.157 If rights 
enforcement is accomplished using liability rules, then an infringer who acts 
                                                                                                                           
would be granted until the company paid the plaintiffs the amount of the permanent damages that had 
been calculated by the lower court. Id. at 228. 
 153 See Boomer, 26 N.Y.2d at 222, 225 (stating that in the case, the plaintiffs had stipulated that 
they would have accepted $185,000 in damages to end the dispute). The cement company’s invest-
ment in the factory was over $45,000,000 and it employed over 300 people. Id. Absent the court’s 
decision, if the landowners were entitled to prevent all activities that polluted their properties, the 
parties may well have entered into an agreement under which the company would pay the landowners 
$185,000, because the company valued using the factory (and continuing to pollute) much more than 
the cost of paying a settlement to the landowners. See POSNER, supra note 92, at 63–64 (providing an 
example in which two parties may bargain rather than litigate an issue). On the other hand, if the right 
to pollute were initially assigned to the factory, the factory would continue polluting and would only 
be motivated to stop in exchange for a payment that exceeded its $45,000,000 investment. See HARRI-
SON, supra note 152, at 146. In either case, the result would be that the factory could continue pollut-
ing indefinitely, because either (1) it pays the plaintiffs permanent damages, preventing any future 
action against the factory for polluting, or (2) it has the initial right to pollute and the plaintiffs are 
unable to pay $45,000,000. See id. (explaining how the market may overcome the court’s determina-
tion). 
 154 See HARRISON, supra note 152, at 191 (introducing entitlements in the context of the Coase 
Theorem). When faced with two parties in conflict, a state must either decide which party it wishes to 
assign a right or be content with allowing the side with more resources to win. Guido Calabresi & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972). For example, in the context of a polluter and those affected, a state 
will either assign a right to pollute to the polluter or a right to a clean environment to those who would 
otherwise have been affected by pollution. Id. 
 155 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 154, at 1090. 
 156 Id. at 1092. 
 157 Id. This approach requires the least amount of government involvement. Id. After the right is 
assigned, the parties are free to contract to ascertain a fair value for which one may purchase the right. 
Id. Such rules are observable in well-established property laws such as easements, which a property 
owner may sell to another party, granting that party the right to use some portion of the property for a 
defined purpose. See generally John W. Fisher, II, A Survey of Easements in West Virginia, 112 W. 
VA. L. REV. 637 (2010) (explaining that landowners may expressly grant other parties an easement 
over their land). 
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against the right will have to pay the right holder some value, as determined by 
a court after the infringement has occurred.158 
1. Property Rules to Protect Forced Vesting 
States seeking to implement forced vesting provisions in their laws may 
find property rules desirable because of the potential for bargaining between 
lenders and borrowers to resolve mortgage conflicts.159 The act of a borrower 
forcibly vesting title in a lender would trigger financial consequences for both 
parties.160 Perhaps most significant are the tax implications associated with 
transfers of property.161 Under current laws (without forced vesting), lenders 
are vehemently opposed to taking title to the properties subject to mortgages 
because title carries with it the obligation to maintain the home.162 Therefore, a 
forced vesting provision with a corresponding ability for borrowers to waive 
that right during a foreclosure would induce bargaining.163 This is because, if 
lenders believed receiving title to property would be financially unfavorable, 
they would be willing to negotiate with borrowers to not exercise that right of 
transfer.164 
                                                                                                                           
 158 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 154, at 1090. This approach requires more state involve-
ment because of the need to determine the value of the destroyed entitlement. Id. Unlike with property 
rules, parties do not contract for the removal of the rule, but rather, the state imposes its own valua-
tion. Id. 
 159 See id.; Coase, supra note 91, at 9 (discussing how bargaining may achieve the most desired 
result). 
 160 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1, 11, 61, 108, 121, 166, 1001, 1011, 1012, 1016. For borrowers, gains de-
rived from dispositions of property or discharge of indebtedness will constitute gross income. See id. 
§ 61(a). For lenders, transfers of title in their name would cause them to be liable for the obligations 
associated with the property. See Weber, supra note 6, at 37 (discussing how title makes one liable for 
associated costs with respect to the property). 
 161 See 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (stating that gains from dealings in property are gross income); § 166(a) 
(allowing deductions for business debts that become worthless). 
 162 See Tosi, 546 B.R. at 489 (explaining that the lender did not want to take title to the property); 
Sagendorph, 2015 WL 3867955, at *1 (indicating that the lender objected to taking title to the proper-
ty). 
 163 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 154, at 1092 (explaining how property rules would 
allow one to waive the right in an exchange). 
 164 Clark, supra note 3, at 801–02 (discussing how lenders analyze the costs and revenues they 
would receive from continuing with a foreclosure or stopping a foreclosure and explaining how that 
influences their decision to continue or not). Presuming that lenders act rationally—which, in this 
case, is the presumption that they act based solely on financial incentives—bargaining for a better 
financial outcome under this proposed scheme would be intuitive. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 87, at 8 
(discussing how economics and the idea that people will act rationally in response to legal rules is a 
proper way to evaluate how certain laws will influence behavior). Because businesses must act ration-
ally to be successful, this is a proper presumption to make. The University of Chicago, supra note 92 
(discussing how businesses act rationally). 
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2. An Alternative Approach: Liability Rules 
Another option in protecting entitlements is the concept of a liability 
rule.165 States that do not wish to give borrowers the right to forcibly transfer 
property to a lender may alternatively opt to give communities a right to be 
free from the nuisances caused by unmaintained homes.166 In such a case, 
lenders who fail to maintain homes would have to compensate the affected 
neighboring homeowners.167 
III. LAW AND ECONOMICS PRESENTS A LENS THROUGH WHICH STATES 
MAY EXAMINE HOW TO PREVENT ZOMBIE MORTGAGES 
A. The Justification for the Applicability of Law and Economics  
to the Borrower-Lender Relationship 
Law and economics provides a lens to examine how two rational actors 
can reach an efficient result through bargaining.168 State legislatures in part 
concerned with the economic effect of these properties on the surrounding 
communities have enacted statutes to deal with zombie mortgages after they 
arise.169 Therefore, the implementation of state forced vesting laws to prevent 
the rise of zombie mortgages would be desirable to encourage lenders and bor-
rowers to bargain.170 Law and economics presents a lens through which this 
can be accomplished.171 
                                                                                                                           
 165 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 154, at 1092 (discussing liability rules). 
 166 See Weiss, supra note 31, at 487 (noting that zombie mortgages foster the belief that a neigh-
borhood is unsafe and drive down property values); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 154, at 1092 
(noting that violators of liability rules must pay damages). These properties often attract squatters and 
become the sites of illegal activities like drug use and arson. Weiss, supra note 31, at 486. 
 167 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 154, at 1092 (discussing how liability rules would im-
pose penalties on those who violate a right that is protected by such a rule). 
 168 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 87, at 8 (discussing rationality); Coase, supra note 91, at 8 (dis-
cussing efficiency). 
 169 See, e.g., Abandoned and Blighted Property Conservatorship Act, 68 PA. STAT. AND CONS. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 1101–1111 (West 2016) (responding to the growing problem of abandoned homes in 
Pennsylvania and explaining how they have negative effects on the communities); Save New Jersey 
Homes Act of 2008, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-37 (West 2019) (explaining how foreclosure effective-
ly deprives homeowners of their most significant assets and discussing the adverse economic effect 
that a foreclosure has on surrounding properties), repealed by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-48 (creating 
a sunset provision in 2008 to render the Save New Jersey Homes Act of 2008 inoperative on January 
1, 2011). 
 170 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 87, at 8 (discussing how rational actors bargain); Coase, supra note 
91, at 8 (discussing how an optimal result may occur through bargain). 
 171 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 87, at 8 (discussing how rational actors respond to laws and how 
this lens is appropriate to evaluate how laws should be implemented). See generally supra note 87 
(giving an overview of the economic approach to law and its potential applications). 
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The borrower-lender transaction is one where this approach is appropri-
ate.172 The common criticisms of the idea that people behave rationally can be 
overcome in this particular transaction.173 On the one hand, a lender is moti-
vated to profit from a foreclosure and does not behave irrationally in deciding 
whether or not to foreclose.174 On the other hand, there is the merited argument 
that people are not the rational actors economists assume they are.175 Nonethe-
less, by disregarding transaction costs, the issue may be resolved by imagining 
a borrower represented by a lawyer for the purpose of meeting the rationality 
requirement.176 Lawyers, after all, are themselves transaction costs in a deal.177 
A lawyer behaves rationally on behalf of a client because that is part of a law-
yer’s duty to clients.178 Lawyers are bound to act in their client’s best interests 
by the nature of their jobs and by professional and ethical rules.179 Effectively, 
a borrower’s lawyer in a borrower-lender transaction stands in the shoes of the 
borrower client.180 The result is then a borrower-lender transaction with two 
rational parties.181 
B. Establishing a New Property Right for Borrowers 
Taking the approach that the borrower and lender would act rationally in a 
deal with no transaction costs, one may evaluate how they would act in the 
                                                                                                                           
 172 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 87, at 8 (discussing how rational actors may be influenced to act in 
response to certain laws). 
 173 See The University of Chicago, supra note 92 (discussing how businesses act rationally); see 
also FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at 403 (discussing how having negative equity 
in their houses has influenced borrowers to choose to default based on financial incentives). 
 174 University of Chicago, supra note 92; see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 
28, at 15 (discussing how lenders perform an equity analysis before foreclosure). 
 175 See University of Chicago, supra note 92 (noting that people do not necessarily consistently 
behave rationally and may occasionally engage in irrational conduct, at least as rationality is under-
stood from an economic perspective). 
 176 See POSNER, supra note 92, at 10 (discussing how disregarding transaction costs allows one to 
examine how parties bargain over property rights). 
 177 See David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking 
Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 62 (2005) (noting that 
people hire and pay lawyers to deal with problems or help with business decisions). 
 178 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (stating that lawyers must 
be competent and prepared and possess all knowledge and skills that are reasonably needed to repre-
sent a client). 
 179 See id. 
 180 See id. r. 2.1 (stating that lawyers must consider their client’s needs in terms of economic and 
social factors that matter to the client). 
 181 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at 403 (discussing how borrowers may 
plan to default based on financial incentives); FRIEDMAN, supra note 87, at 8 (discussing rationality 
among actors in a bargain and efficient outcomes and the interaction of law and rational actors); The 
University of Chicago, supra note 92 (discussing how business decisions are largely rational). 
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presence of certain, clearly defined property rights.182 Property rights are ini-
tially determined by the state.183 Moreover, state legislatures have the oppor-
tunity to determine what policies they wish to implement for their communi-
ties.184 Therefore, it is possible that a solution to the zombie problem may be 
found in state legislatures.185 Bankruptcy courts introduced the idea of transfer-
ring title to property without a lender’s consent when their inaction with re-
spect to a foreclosed property resulted in a zombie mortgage.186 Law and eco-
nomics may be a viable lens through which a state might consider establishing 
a new property right: the right of a borrower to forcibly vest title in a lender 
upon the lender’s continuous neglect of the property resulting in the accumula-
tion of fees and costs.187 
The rise in zombie mortgages after the 2008 financial crisis has shown 
what may result when lenders do not complete foreclosures on homes that bor-
rowers abandoned in reliance on the belief that their homes were lost.188 Im-
plementing a property right that gives borrowers this power to vest property in 
lenders may have the effect of encouraging bargaining between borrowers and 
lenders in a foreclosure situation.189 The effectiveness of this approach is, of 
                                                                                                                           
 182 See POSNER, supra note 92, at 10 (discussing how parties may bargain over the use of proper-
ty). 
 183 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979);see also, Mian, supra note 15, at 2588 (ex-
plaining how state law creates a distinction between judicial and non-judicial foreclosure states that affects 
lender/borrower relationships with respect to a home). 
 184 See, e.g., Conlin, supra note 117 (discussing approaches that Ohio municipalities have taken 
to combatting zombies); Lane, supra note 117 (discussing New York’s policy aimed at zombie mort-
gages); Redden, supra note 117 (discussing the shift in Portland’s stance on zombie mortgages to 
considering them as a lesser priority than before). 
 185 See, e.g., Conlin, supra note 117 (discussing the policies Ohio municipalities implemented in 
response to zombie mortgages). 
 186 See, e.g, In re Tosi, 546 B.R. 487, 489 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2016) (disallowing forced vesting); In 
re Sagendorph, No. 14-41675-MSH, 2015 WL 3867955, at *1, *2 (Bankr. D. Mass. June 22, 2015), 
rev’d, In re Sagendorph, 562 B.R. 545 (D. Mass. 2017) (interpreting the Bankrptcy Code to allow 
forced vesting); In re Zair, 535 B.R. 15, 17 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d, HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. 
Zair, 550 B.R. 188 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (allowing forced vesting title in a lender); In re Stewart, 536 B.R. 
273, 274 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2015) (allowing forced vesting because the lender did not object); In re 
Williams, 542 B.R. 514, 517 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2015) (disallowing forced vesting as part of a plan); In 
re Watt, 520 B.R. 834, 835–36 (Bankr. D. Or. 2014), vacated Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Watt, No. 3:14-
CV-02051-AA, 2015 WL 1879680 (D. Or. Apr. 22, 2015) (allowing a plan to forcibly vest title in a 
lender over its objection); In re Rosa, 495 B.R. 522, 523 (Bankr. D. Haw. 2013) (discussing the possi-
bility of vesting title in a lender as part of a Chapter 13 plan). 
 187 See supra note 186 and accompanying text (illustrating the origination of forced vesting in 
bankruptcy courts); see also POSNER, supra note 92, at 10 (explaining how parties may bargain over 
the use or allocation of property rights). 
 188 See generally Boyack & Berger, supra note 6; Clark, supra note 3, at 801; McQuade, supra 
note 6; Weber, supra note 6. 
 189 See generally Coase, supra note 91 (discussing transaction costs and how disregarding them 
would indicate what the efficient outcome would be). 
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course, contingent on allowing the free transfer of the proposed right.190 By 
disregarding transaction costs, an efficient solution may exist where both the 
lender and the borrower are in a better position.191 
1. Forced Vesting with Nonrecourse Mortgages 
A borrower considering default on a nonrecourse mortgage faces the pos-
sibility of realizing the entire value of the outstanding debt on the home as a 
taxable gain.192 If a lender completes the foreclosure, gain to the borrower 
would be the amount realized less the adjusted basis of the home.193 The bor-
rower would then be able to exclude up to $250,000 from taxes if the require-
ments under the IRC are met.194 Because zombie mortgages are typically asso-
ciated with low-value homes, it is likely that the gain would typically be under 
$250,000.195 Upon a borrower’s default, a lender would have to determine 
whether the costs of foreclosure and the expected revenue from selling the 
home would make foreclosure worthwhile.196 When lenders foreclose on a 
home subject to a nonrecourse mortgage, but only conduct an analysis and dis-
cover that foreclosure is no longer worth the cost after the borrower has al-
ready left, then a zombie mortgage may rise.197 
In zombie mortgage scenarios, mortgage penalties, as well as mainte-
nance costs and taxes, accrue to the titleholder, which is typically the home-
owner.198 Lenders may refuse to negotiate with the borrowers at this point, dis-
claiming any responsibility for the home.199 If a forced vesting provision exist-
                                                                                                                           
 190 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 154, at 1092 (discussing how legislatures may statutori-
ly allow for property rights to be transferred). 
 191 Coase, supra note 91, at 2. 
 192 McMahon & Simmons, supra note 73, at 427. 
 193 Hetherington & Hurley, supra note 76, at 58. 
 194 See 26 U.S.C. § 121(a)–(b) (2017) (requiring that the home be used as the borrower’s principal 
residence for two of the preceding five years and limiting the exclusion to $250,000 for single filers 
and $500,000 for joint filers). 
 195 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 14 (explaining that abandoned 
properties subject to foreclosure are typically in low-income neighborhoods with already low property 
values). 
 196 Id. at 15. Even if a lender pursues foreclosure, doing so could still be a lengthy process. Her-
kenhoff & Ohanian, supra note 19 (noting that after the financial crisis, foreclosures increased in 
duration from an average of nine to fifteen months). 
 197 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 17 (explaining that lenders were 
more likely to discontinue foreclosure proceedings when homeowners abandoned the foreclosed prop-
erties). 
 198 See Conlin, supra note 117 (discussing how one homeowner’s mortgage debt jumped from 
approximately $60,000 to over $80,000 and how another homeowner was liable for $1,000 in water 
and garbage disposal bills as well as the potential for $30,000 in demolition costs if the city decided to 
pursue destruction of the abandoned home). 
 199 See id. (explaining how one bank refused to accept a deed to the house and has refused to let 
the owner sell the home for less than the value of the debt). In fact, commentators have argued that a 
major issue behind the foreclosure crisis was that lenders were often hostile to the idea of renegotiat-
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ed in state law, then borrowers would be able to overcome lenders’ unwilling-
ness to negotiate by transferring title to lenders.200 Given lenders’ financial 
incentives, the presence of such a provision in state law would be a factor in 
their analysis of costs.201 In a situation where a lender’s cancellation of fore-
closure has created a zombie mortgage, the former borrowers would be in-
clined to transfer the title to lenders.202 Knowing this, lenders subject to a 
forced vesting provision would have an incentive to prevent a zombie mort-
gage from arising in the first place, because they would risk being subject to 
the liabilities and fees associated with holding title to the property.203 The re-
sult would be two-fold: first, lenders would have the incentive to conduct the 
foreclosure cost analysis before foreclosing to evaluate whether sale of the 
home would be worthwhile.204 Second, lenders may be inclined to decrease the 
mortgage to match the value of the home.205 If a lender were to offer such a 
modification, borrowers who agree to continue making the reduced mortgage 
payments would potentially bear a small additional tax burden from the “in-
come” of having their debt reduced, and lenders would receive a tax deduction 
for “writing off” the uncollectable portion of the debt.206 Thus, borrowers that 
                                                                                                                           
ing mortgages. Adelino et al., supra note 20, at 835. Over a six-year period from 2005 to 2011, lend-
ers only renegotiated approximately 10% of mortgages that were past due. Id. 
 200 See Boyack & Berger, supra note 6, at 455 (discussing transfers of title and corresponding 
legal obligations); supra note 187 and accompanying text (illustrating the journey of forced vesting in 
bankruptcy and discussing how bargaining may result in efficient outcomes). 
 201 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 15 (speaking of “projected” costs 
and profits). 
 202 See Boyack & Berger, supra note 6, at 455 (giving an overview of zombie mortgages and 
discussing how the only way to stop property liabilities from accruing in one’s name is to transfer title 
to the property). Borrowers in this situation would have strong tax incentives to transfer title to the 
lender. See 26 U.S.C. § 121 (allowing exclusion of $250,000 or $500,000 of gain from the disposition 
of property, depending on one’s filing status). Because zombie mortgages are usually in areas with 
lower property values, it is reasonable to conclude that the vast majority would not involve gains 
greater than the permitted exclusion. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 14 
(discussing the financial position of communities with abandoned foreclosures). 
 203 See Clark, supra note 3, at 797 (describing the lender practice of halting foreclosure proceed-
ings to avoid being responsible for maintaining the property and paying the necessary costs inherent to 
foreclosure). 
 204 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 15 (explaining the process of analyz-
ing the costs and prospective revenue to lenders who are considering foreclosing on a home). Because 
the proposed forced vesting provision would raise the risk of increased costs to lenders if they failed 
to maintain the home, it would be a factor in their decision to foreclose. See id. (discussing lenders’ 
considerations of foreclosure costs). 
 205 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at 403 (explaining that the primary 
reason for default is when mortgage debt exceeds the value of a borrower’s home). Because borrowers 
are most likely to default when their mortgages are “underwater” (meaning that the home is worth less 
than the mortgage debt), they would likely continue making payments once the debt matched the 
value of their homes. See id. at 403–04 (discussing underwater mortgages). 
 206 See 26 U.S.C. § 1 (listing the rates at which different levels of income are taxed); § 11(b) 
(imposing a flat tax of 21% on corporations); § 61(a)(11) (listing cancellation of debt as includable in 
gross income); § 108(a)(1)(B) (allowing exclusion of income from gross income if the individual has 
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would otherwise default due to negative equity considerations would continue 
paying the remainder of the mortgage and lenders would recoup some of their 
investment by collecting on the remaining debt over the life of the modified 
mortgage.207 Though borrowers may incur a small tax liability, it may be ra-
tional for them to accept this modification because it might be substantially 
less expensive than moving to another home.208 
2. Forced Vesting with Recourse Mortgages 
Considering the effects of forced vesting provisions on recourse mortgag-
es requires a two-prong analysis because gains to the borrower from the trans-
action are bifurcated into two parts: (1) gain from the disposition of the proper-
ty and (2) potential gain if the lender forgives any remaining debt.209 In a re-
course mortgage, if a home has outstanding debt in excess of its value, a lender 
who successfully forecloses on it has the right to pursue the borrower for the 
                                                                                                                           
more debts than assets); § 166 (allowing corporations to deduct debts that become worthless from 
their taxable income). The median household income in the United States is approximately $56,000. 
Proctor et al., Income and Poverty in the United States: 2015, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sep. 13, 2016), 
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-256.html [https://perma.cc/6NHJ-
BZJD]. Because most zombie mortgages occur in areas of lower-income, it is most likely that borrow-
ers affected by the problem have income at or lower than that level. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, supra note 28, at 14 (discussing the low-income status of these borrowers). Therefore, the 
majority of the income for heads of households may likely be taxed at 12%, with a portion being taxed 
at 22%. See § 1 (listing income between $13,600 and $51,800 as being taxed at 12%, and anything 
more up to $82,500 being taxed at 22%). For example, if a borrower had an annual income of $40,000 
and had $10,000 of debt cancelled, that $10,000 would constitute gross income and, at a 12% tax rate, 
would constitute $1200 of tax liability. See §§ 1, 108 (discussing gross income and cancellation of 
debt income). The lender would then deduct that $10,000 as a worthless or “bad” debt. See § 166(a)(1) 
(allowing a deduction for business bad debts). Under the 21% tax rate, the lender would save $2100 in 
taxes. See § 11(b) (stating that the corporate tax rate is 21%). 
 207 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 1, at 403 (explaining that borrowers with 
underwater mortgages tend to default on their homes). By extension, if a borrower’s mortgage was 
reduced to match the home’s value, there would be a lower likelihood of default. See id. (explaining 
how borrowers may often plan to default in cases of underwater mortgages). 
 208 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 87, at 8 (discussing rationality); FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 403 (discussing how financial incentives are the primary reason for mortgage 
default). As of January 2019, the median sale price of a home was $317,200. Median Sale Price for 
New Houses Sold in the United States, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.
org/series/MSPNHSUS [https://perma.cc/3PFX-X3MR?type=image]. Moreover, mortgage loans 
typically require down payments, which may range from 3–20%. Teresa Mears, First-Time Buyers: 
How Much Down Payment Do You Really Need These Days?, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 20, 2016), https://
realestate.usnews.com/real-estate/articles/first-time-buyers-how-much-down-payment-do-you-really-
need-these-days [https://perma.cc/Q85X-4VDP]. 
 209 See Hetherington & Hurley, supra note 76, at 75 (explaining that borrowers may be subject to 
both gain and cancellation of debt income, depending on lender actions); see also Gomez, supra note 
50, at 76 (explaining that, because the maximum a lender can recover in foreclosure is the value of the 
home, recourse mortgages allow lenders to pursue the borrower for any remaining debt). 
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remaining debt, or to forgive the debt.210 As with nonrecourse mortgages, if the 
sale price exceeds the borrower’s basis in the home, there will be gain recogni-
tion to the extent of the difference.211 The same provisions in Section 121 of 
the IRC would allow the borrower to exclude recognition of up to $250,000 of 
gain.212 The difference between recourse and nonrecourse mortgages, however, 
is that if, after the sale of the house the lender is still not made whole on the 
mortgage, the lender could pursue the borrower for the remaining amount bor-
rowed.213 If a zombie recourse mortgage exists, borrowers that invoke the right 
to forcibly vest title to the lender may indeed relieve themselves of mainte-
nance obligations and other fees.214 There is, however, another piece to the 
puzzle: even if borrowers can shift those extra costs onto lenders, if borrowers 
still have outstanding debt following the foreclosure sale, lenders may pursue 
them to recover those costs and any other amounts remaining on the mort-
gage.215 
Because of the costs discussed above, the threat of forced vesting may not 
be as effective in encouraging a lender to renegotiate a recourse mortgage as a 
nonrecourse mortgage.216 The effectiveness of the threat would depend on the 
onerousness of state taxes and fees associated with property ownership, which 
can differ widely.217 The problem is financial uncertainty: lenders would know 
                                                                                                                           
 210 See Gomez, supra note 50, at 76 (explaining that, because the maximum a lender can recover 
in foreclosure is the value of the home, recourse mortgages allow lenders to pursue the borrower for 
any remaining debt). 
 211 Hetherington & Hurley, supra note 76, at 58. 
 212 See 26 U.S.C. § 121 (allowing taxpayers to exclude up to $250,000 of gain for single filers 
and $500,000 for joint filers). 
 213 See Hetherington & Hurley, supra note 76, at 75 (explaining that lenders have a choice as to 
whether to pursue the borrower for a deficiency). 
 214 See Boyack & Berger, supra note 6, at 455 (stating that borrowers cannot abandon their legal 
obligations without transferring title to another party). These obligations may cost thousands of dol-
lars to cure. See Conlin, supra note 117 (describing an instance where code violations resulted in fines 
over $4000). 
 215 See Gomez, supra note 50, at 76 (discussing recourse mortgages). Lenders choose to abandon 
foreclosure proceedings when costs exceed revenues. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
supra note 28, at 15 (discussing cost and revenue analysis). Their incentives are essentially strictly 
economic. See id. If borrowers were to exercise rights that impose extra costs on lenders, such as 
maintenance fees, lenders would have the incentive to pursue the borrower to recover those costs as 
opposed to forgiving the debt. See Clark, supra note 3, at 801–02 (explaining that lenders stop fore-
closure proceedings when costs exceed revenues); Gomez, supra note 50, at 76 (discussing recourse 
mortgage). 
 216 See Gomez, supra note 50, at 76 (explaining the economic incentives of borrowers and lenders 
in scenarios of forced vesting and recourse mortgages). 
 217 See John S. Kiernan, 2018’s Property Taxes by State, WALLETHUB (Feb. 27, 2018), https://
wallethub.com/edu/states-with-the-highest-and-lowest-property-taxes/11585 [https://perma.cc/YBN7-
QCWM] (listing real estate taxes across all states). Hawaii, for example, has the lowest average real-
estate tax rate at 0.27%. Id. New Jersey, on the other hand, has the highest average real estate tax at 
2.40%. Id. This may be a significant reason as to why New Jersey was plagued with more zombie 
mortgages than any other state. See Ramírez, supra note 118 (stating that New Jersey had over 4,000 
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that cancelling a foreclosure and not incurring maintenance costs could subject 
them to the forced vesting provision, and borrowers would face the potential 
for subsequent recourse—that is, lenders may seek repayment of the remaining 
debt—if borrowers exercise the forced vesting provision.218 If, at the time that 
the borrower is considering forced vesting, the liabilities on the property ex-
ceed the outstanding debt, borrowers would be incentivized to forcibly vest 
title to their lenders.219 Another risk that lenders face in pursuing borrowers for 
money is the possibility that borrowers would file for bankruptcy, leaving 
lenders with the expense of having pursued the debt but little or no recovery of 
those funds.220 
The solution to the uncertainty lies in creating certainty through bar-
gain.221 Lenders do not want title to the property and borrowers may be subject 
to lenders seeking financial recourse against them.222 Thus, in exchange for the 
borrower waiving the right to forcibly vest title in the future, the lender should 
switch the mortgage from recourse to nonrecourse and decrease the outstand-
ing debt to match the value of the home.223 This change from recourse to non-
recourse is not a taxable event and will not subject either party to tax costs.224 
                                                                                                                           
zombie mortgages in 2016). Moreover, maintenance fees and costs can vary widely and may be diffi-
cult to predict. See Conlin, supra note 117 (giving examples of a $300 fee for lawn maintenance, a 
$1,000 fee for water and garbage service, and a $4,185 fee for municipal code penalties). 
 218 See Hetherington & Hurley, supra note 76, at 75 (explaining that lenders may pursue borrow-
ers for the remaining debt); Conlin, supra note 217 (discussing the fees associated with zombie mort-
gages). 
 219 See Hetherington & Hurley, supra note 76, at 75 (explaining that monetary liabilities associat-
ed with recourse mortgages include subjecting borrowers to both gain and cancellation of debt in-
come, depending on lender actions); Gomez, supra note 50, at 76 (explaining that monetary liabilities 
associated with recourse mortgages include the ability of lenders to pursue the borrower for any re-
maining debt). Because the outstanding debt would be less than the liabilities, the rational choice 
would be to choose the option that costs the least, being forced vesting. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 87, 
at 8 (elaborating on rationality). 
 220 See generally In re Rosa, 495 B.R. 522 (indicating that the debtor filed for bankruptcy after 
her home had almost no equity and she could hardly afford mortgage payments). 
 221 See POSNER, supra note 92, at 10 (explaining how parties may bargain over the use or alloca-
tion of property rights). 
 222 See Tosi, 546 B.R. at 490 (indicating that the lender objected to accepting title to the home); 
Gomez, supra note 50, at 76 (explaining that lenders may choose to pursue borrowers for deficiencies 
after foreclosure). 
 223 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 154, at 1092 (explaining bargaining over property rules). 
 224 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3(e)(5)(ii)(B)(2)(i) (2013) (stating that modifying a debt from re-
course to nonrecourse is not a “significant modification” for tax purposes if certain criteria are met, 
and thus is not subject to taxation). Regulation 1.1001-3 gives a set of rules for determining whether 
modifying a debt instrument counts as an exchange of property—which would be a taxable event. Id. 
§ 1.1001-3(a)(1). In general, a significant modification is treated as an exchange under Section 1001 
of the IRC. Id. § 1.1001-3(b). Moreover, a change from recourse to nonrecourse debt is generally 
treated as a significant modification. Id. § 1.1001-3(e)(5)(ii)(A). If, however, the modification to a 
debt instrument still secures the initial collateral (in this case, the home) and does not constitute a 
change in payments, then it is not a significant modification, is thus not an exchange, and thus not 
taxable. Id. § 1.1001-3(e)(5)(ii)(B)(2)(i). 
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The amount of the mortgage debt that is cancelled will constitute cancellation 
of debt income for the borrower and a tax deduction for the lender.225 
C. An Alternative Approach: Liability Rules for Communities 
States not wishing to enact the proposed laws may still consider enacting 
a liability rule to protect communities from the financial consequences of 
zombie mortgages.226 Such a rule would give the community a right to be free 
from lenders neglecting a property after stopping foreclosure.227 This is similar 
to the idea of the lender as a “polluter” and the community as the group being 
affected by the pollution.228 Lenders who infringe on the community’s right to 
be free from dilapidated abandoned houses and their effects would be subject 
to penalties to compensate the community for the resulting damage.229 Alt-
hough enactment of such a liability rule might be a way to minimize the nega-
tive effects that lenders impose on communities, it would require more over-
sight.230 A legislature or court may have to calculate damages in the event that 
both parties disagree on their extent.231 Moreover, before damages may be as-
sessed, the zombie mortgage, the creature that forced vesting can prevent, 
would already have to exist.232 Although the damages-based approach may be 
                                                                                                                           
 225 See 26 U.S.C. § 1 (listing the various tax rates); § 11(b) (using a flat tax of 21% on corpora-
tions); § 61(a)(11) (stating that gross income includes cancellation of debt income); § 108(a)(1)(B) 
(allowing an insolvent individual to exclude a certain amount of income from being taxed); § 166 
(allowing for corporations to deduct worthless debts from income). 
 226 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 154, at 1092 (discussing how states can protect an enti-
tlement through liability rules). 
 227 See id. (stating that holders of entitlements protected by liability rules have the right to the 
entitlement up until it is destroyed and compensation is paid). 
 228 See, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219 (N.Y. 1970) (involving a cement com-
pany whose pollution caused damage to neighboring communities). The court ultimately held that the 
cement company could purchase the plaintiffs’ right to clean air for the amount of permanent damages 
the pollution caused. Id. at 228. 
 229 See id. at 225 (discussing how the polluter could potentially pay the landowners for the overall 
negative economic effect the pollution had on their properties). 
 230 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 154, at 1092 (stating that liability rules require the state to 
determine the amount that is to be paid in compensation). Of course, if the opposing parties were in 
agreement as to how much the damage was worth, they could settle the matter through private bar-
gaining rather than disputing the amount. See Boomer, 26 N.Y.2d at 225 (noting that the plaintiffs 
stipulated they would have accepted $185,000 to settle the lawsuit); HARRISON, supra note 152, at 
160 (explaining how bargaining could have resulted in no need for the court’s determination in the 
Boomer case). 
 231 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 154, at 1092 (discussing state valuation of damages). 
 232 See id. (explaining that liability rules would result in damages when a party violated the enti-
tlement, or right, being protected by the rule). If an entitlement to be free from the “pollution” of 
zombie mortgages existed, it would only be broken if the lender actually allowed a zombie mortgage 
to arise. See id. (discussing violations of liability rules). 
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desirable to protect communities, such an approach would not fully solve the 
problem of zombie mortgages.233 
CONCLUSION 
The 2008 financial crisis and the wave of unfinished foreclosures that fol-
lowed brought zombie mortgages into the national spotlight. Borrowers who 
abandoned their homes in response to foreclosure actions by lenders thought 
their titles had died with the foreclosure. When lenders did not complete fore-
closure proceedings, borrowers remained liable for their mortgage liabilities 
and other fees and costs associated with not maintaining the property. The re-
sult was the zombie mortgage, a property that is blighted and rotting, causing 
issues for borrowers and surrounding communities. Bankruptcy courts intro-
duced the idea of allowing these financially distressed individuals to transfer 
title to their lenders without the lender’s consent or over their express objec-
tions. Although appeals courts have largely disallowed such forced vesting in 
the context of bankruptcy proceedings, state law could still create a forced 
vesting mechanism to combat zombie mortgages. State legislatures, heavily 
influenced by financial incentives, have enacted statutes that deal with the 
treatment of abandoned properties. Law and economics presents a lens through 
which states may examine the desirability of adding forced vesting provisions 
to their statutes to incentivize lenders and borrowers to reach agreements be-
fore a distressed property becomes a zombie. By statutorily allocating to bor-
rowers the right to transfer title to a lender under certain circumstances, states 
can encourage borrowers and lenders to negotiate mutually beneficial mort-
gage reductions. This mechanism would be effective regardless of whether a 
mortgage is recourse or nonrecourse. The tax effects of a borrower’s decision 
to exercise forced vesting rights would provide the largest financial motivation 
for both parties to negotiate for a mutually beneficial economic outcome. For 
state legislatures that are concerned with adverse economic effects on their 
communities and seek an economically efficient solution, this approach may 
very well provide a strong justification for the creation of a statutory right of 
forced vesting. 
ROMAN IBRAGIMOV 
                                                                                                                           
 233 See id. (indicating that damages would be imposed under a liability rule only when a party 
already violated the entitlement, or right, being protected by the rule). 
